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LOOKING DOWN FROM THE HILL: FACTORS
DETERMINING THE SUCCESS OF CONGRESSIONAL
EFFORTS TO REVERSE SUPREME COURT
INTERPRETATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION
That there ought to be one court of supreme and final jurisdiction, is a proposition which is not likely to be contested....
A legislature, without exceeding its province, cannot reverse
a determination once made in a particular case; though it may
prescribe a new rule for future cases.'
Throughout the 200-year history of the United States Constitution, frequent debate has arisen over the proper roles of the
three branches of the federal government in interpreting the
Constitution. The Supreme Court has, in recent years, expressed
the view that the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition
of the law under the Constitution. 2 Under this view, once the
Supreme Court has spoken regarding a constitutional issue, only
the Court itself can alter that interpretation of the Constitution.
Other observers, including Abraham Lincoln,3 have argued that
although court decisions are binding on the parties in a specific
case, they are not necessarily permanently binding on the other
branches of government. 4 Noting the oath taken by the Executive
to "preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United

1. THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 523, 526 (Alexander Hamilton) (Mod. Libr. 1937).
2. See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
(1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
3. Lincoln/Douglas Sixth Joint Debate at Quincy, IMI.(Oct. 13, 1858), in 3 THE COLLECTED
WoRs OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 245, 255 (Roy Basler ed., 1953). Referring to his unwillingness
to be bound by the Supreme Court's decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.)
393 (1856), Lincoln stated he opposed viewing the holding "as a political rule . . . which
shall be binding on the members of Congress or the President to favor no measure that
does not actually concur with the principles of that decision." 3 THE COLLECTED WORKS
OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, sttpra, at 255.
4. A more recent proponent of this viewpoint was Edwin Meese, United States Attorney
General during the Reagan administration. See Edwin Meese HI, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TUL. L. Rnv. 979, 985-86 (1987):
[Clonstitutional interpretation is not the business of the Court only, but also
properly the business of all branches of government.
The Supreme Court, then, is not the only interpreter of the Constitution.
Each of the three coordinate branches of government created and empowered
by the Constitution-the executive and legislative no less than the judicialhas a duty to interpret the Constitution in the performance of its official
functions.
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States" 5 and the similar oath taken by members of Congress, 6
proponents of this view argue that all branches of the government
have both a right and a duty to interpret the Constitution.
The constitutional amendment process, of course, provides Congress with a direct mechanism by which, with the approval of
three-fourths of the states, it can alter the Constitution itself in
response to a Supreme Court decision.7 Indeed, Congress has
employed this mechanism on a number of occasions. In 1971, for
example, Congress passed the Twenty-sixth Amendment guaranteeing eighteen-year-olds the right to vote8 in response to the
Supreme Court's decision in Oregon v. Mitchell.9 Similarly, in
1909, Congress passed the Sixteenth Amendment authorizing an
income tax 10 to reverse the effects of Pollock v. Farmers' Loan
& Trust Co." Although the amendment process is an available
option, Congress has been hesitant to employ it for a variety of
reasons. 12 This reluctance has not, however, meant that Congress
has silently acquiesced when it has disagreed with the Court's
reading of the Constitution.
The Legislature has instead, at times, sought a change not in
the Constitution itself, but rather in the prevailing interpretation
of its language. By enacting federal statutes that directly contradict the Court's constitutional interpretations, the Legislature
has, in effect, directly challenged the Supreme Court's view of
itself as "supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution." 3 In some of these instances, the Court has shown deference

14
to Congress and has allowed congressional actions to stand.

5. U.S. CONST. art. II, S 1, cl.7.
6. Id. art. VI, ci. 3 (prescribing language for the congressional oath "to support this
Constitution").
7. Id. art. V.
8. Id. amend. XXVI, S 1.
9. 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
10. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
11. 157 U.S. 429, affjd on reh'g, 158 U.S. 601 (1895), overruled by South Carolina v.
Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988). Other amendments Congress approved in response to "unfa-

vorable" Supreme Court decisions include the Eleventh Amendment, guaranteeing states
sovereign immunity in response to Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), and

the Fourteenth Amendment, guaranteeing equal protection of law in response to Dred
Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
12. Among these reasons are the cumbersome nature of the process of ratification by
the states, see infra notes 108-11 and accompanying text, and a general congressional
reluctance to tamper with the Constitution when alternative means are available, see
infra notes 255-61 and accompanying text.
13. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958).

14. For examples of such deference on the part of the Court, see infra notes 125-41
and accompanying text (discussing United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941)) and infra

notes 177-82 and accompanying text (discussing Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States,
379 U.S. 241 (1964)).
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More often, however, the Justices have refused to yield to congressional interpretations that disagree with those of the Court.15
This Note examines several specific occasions in which Congress has attempted to make a role for itself as an interpreter
of the Constitution by intentionally enacting legislation contrary
to existing Supreme Court precedents. 16 Specifically, this Note
discusses Congress' attempts to create a federal law prohibiting
child labor between 1918 and 1940 in response to the Supreme
17 Congress' passage of
Court's decision in Hammer v. Dagenhart,
the public accommodations provisions of the Civil Rights Act of
196418 despite the Court's earlier rejection of similar provisions
in the Civil Rights Cases,19 and congressional attempts to reverse
the effects of Supreme Court decisions with regard to the rights
of criminal defendants in Miranda v. Arizona0 and United States
v. Wad&' and with respect to desecration of the American flag
in Texas v. Johnson.2s This Note analyzes the approaches taken
by Congress in fashioning its responses to the Court and considers the factors that may have contributed to the Court's acceptance or rejection of those responses. Examination of these factors
may permit greater certainty in predicting the outcome of future
cases involving elected branch constitutional interpretations that
challenge Court precedents. Additionally, a recitation of past
congressional failures and successes in challenging the Supreme
Court may help to avert the time-consuming process of trial and
error Congress has experienced previously.
BACKGROUND

Marbury v. Madison established the power of the Supreme
Court to review acts of Congress and to strike down those laws

15. See infra.notes 320-23 and accompanying text (discussing United States v. Eichman,
110 S.Ct. 2404 (1990), the Court's rejection of Congress' flag desecration statute).
16. This Note considers only substantive laws passed to counteract Supreme Court
holdings on constitutional issues. For a discussion of "Court-stripping" proposals-congressional attempts to counteract Supreme Court decisions in such areas as school prayer,
abortion, and busing by removing such issues from the appellate jurisdiction of the federal
courts-see generally Max Baucus & Kenneth R.Kay, The Court Stripping Bills: Their
Impact on the Constitution, the Courts, and Congress, 27 VML. L. REv. 988 (1982); Raoul
Berger, Insulation of Judicial Usurpation: A Comment on Lawrence Sager's "CourtStripping" Polemic, 44 OHIo ST. L.J. 611 (1983).
17. 247 U.S. 251 (1918), overruled by Darby, 312 U.S. at 117.
18. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C. (1988)).
19. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
20. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
21. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
22. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
23. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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found to be repugnant to the Constitution.2 Chief Justice John
Marshall, who wrote the opinion, declared that it "is emphatically
the province and duty of the judicial department to say what
the law is."' The Court further defined the meaning of those
words with respect to Congress sixteen years later in McCulloch
26

v. Maryland:

Should congress, in the execution of its powers, adopt measures
which are prohibited by the constitution; or should congress,
under the pretext of executing its powers, pass laws for the
accomplishment of objects not intrusted to the government; it
would become the painful duty of this tribunal, should a case
requiring such a decision come before it, to say, that such an
act was not the law of the land.2
In the past thirty-five years, the Court has expanded still
further its view of its authority relative to the other branches.
In the 1958 case of Cooper v. Aaron,2 the Court adopted a farreaching interpretation of its decision in Marbury, reading that
opinion to "declare[ ] the basic principle that the federal judiciary
is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution."'
Baker v. Car'-reasserted this view in 1962, describing the Court
as the "ultimate interpreter of the Constitution."' 1
Being the "ultimate interpreter of the Constitution," however,
is not necessarily the same as being the only interpreter. The
Court has conceded that it expects other branches of the federal
government to interpret the Constitution in the course of their
initial deliberations over a proposed action and has stated that
"the interpretation of its powers by any branch is due great
respect from the others,"3 2 including the Court.

24. That power actually may have first been claimed by the Court 11 years earlier in
Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792), in which a majority of the Justices refused to

comply with a statute because it assigned them the duty certifying of pension claimantsa duty not of the judicial nature specified by the Constitution. The Court gave no
extensive justification for this refusal.
25. Marbur'y, 5 U.S. at 177.
26. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
27. Id. at 423. In McCulloch, however, the Court upheld Congress' action creating the
Bank of the United States. Id. at 436.
28. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
29. Id. at 18 (emphasis added).
30. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
31. Id at 211.
32. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703 (1974); see Louis Fisher, Constitutional
Interpretationby Members of Congress, 63 N.C. L. REv. 707, 715 (1985).
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In some cases, the Court has been willing to show a great deal
of deference to congressional interpretations of the Constitution-such deference even has become the controlling factor
behind some of the Court's decisions.P In Rostker v. Goldberg,
for example, a case involving the constitutionality of male-only
registration for the military draft, the Court noted that "[t]he
customary deference accorded the judgments of Congress is certainly appropriate when, as here, Congress specifically considered
the question of the act's constitutionality." 5
As the following case histories demonstrate, however, the
Court's deference to the constitutional judgments of Congress is
limited, particularly in cases in which Congress takes a position
directly contrary to a past Court decision.
CONGRESS TAKES ON THE COURT: FOUR CASE HISTORIES

Child Labor
The Initial Decision
This century's first major dispute between Congress and the
Supreme Court regarding constitutional interpretation arose over
the passage of the Keating-Owen Child Labor Law (Child Labor
Act 36 in 1916.3 The Act prohibited the interstate shipment of
the products of mines and factories that had employed children
m
within thirty days prior to the products' shipment.3
The passage of the original Child Labor Act was itself a major
new assertion of constitutional power by Congress. Previously,

33. Fisher, supra note 32, at 715-16.
34. 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
35. Id. at 64.
36. Act of Sept. 1, 1916, ch. 432, 39 Stat. 675 (1916).
37. Arguably, the true starting date of the dispute was 1906, when Senator Albert J.
Beveridge introduced the first federal child labor bill. Beveridge's bill prohibited any
interstate carrier from transporting the products of any mine or factory that employed
children under 14 years of age. Robert E. Cushman, The National Police Power Under
the Commerce Clause of the Constitution (pt. IV), 3 MINN. L. RaV. 452, 452-54 (1919).
Although Beveridge defended the constitutionality of his bill, the views of others in the
Senate as to its constitutionality generally "ranged from skepticism to the clear conviction
that it was unconstitutional:' Id. at 454. In the House of Representatives, the Judiciary
Committee issued a report setting forth its belief that the bill was clearly invalid. The
Beveridge bill never became law. Id. at 453-54; see also H.R. REP. No. 7304, 59th Cong.,
2d Sess. 8 (1906) (concluding that the federal government "is too weak to undertake the
exercise of the police power of the States" and that "Congress has no jurisdiction or
authority over the subject of woman and child labor").
38. Act of Sept. 1, 1916, S 1.
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Congress had exercised its Commerce Clause power in pursuit
of two broad objectives: the protection of interstate commerce
from injury and obstruction 39 and the prohibition of the use of
interstate commerce to further the distribution of commodities
that were themselves obnoxious in nature, such as lottery tickets
or tainted foodstuffs, or to further the consummation of injurious
schemes, such as prostitution. 40 The Child Labor Act, however,
prohibited the transport of goods that were themselves entirely
harmless both in character and in purpose. 41 The products were
harmful only in that they were produced under conditions that
Congress viewed as injurious to the public welfare. 42
The ground-breaking nature of the Act brought criticism and
questions concerning its constitutionality, not only from employers of child labor and advocates of states' rights, but also
from those who, while sympathising with the objects of the
law, honestly doubted that there was any sound constitutional
basis upon which a child labor law under the commerce clause
could rest; who, in the apt phrase of one of their number, could
not convince themselves "that 'accroachment of power' is expedient when benevolent, and that, though
a child is entitled
43
to protection, the constitution is not."

39. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) (upholding Congress' ability
to act contrary to state laws restricting navigation between two states).
40. Cushman, supra note 37, at 452; see also Andrew A. Bruce, Interstate Commerce
and Child-Labor, 3 MINN. L. REV. 89, 94 (1919):
[Iln the Lottery Case [Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903)], the Pure Food
and Drug Act Case [Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45 (1911)],
and the White Slavery Cases [Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913);
Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917)], the decisions dealt with
things or articles of commerce, or with commercial practices, which in
themselves were nuisances and inherently harmful ... or whose production
was tainted with fraud which would everywhere be condemned and everywhere be deleterious. The things themselves in short were outlaws or were
branded with the brand of Cain.
41. Act of Sept. 1, 1916.
42. Cushman, supra note 37, at 452 ("Like an illegitimate child, they were made to
bear the taint of the evil which brought them into existence; the disability which attached
to them was created . . .because [Congress] wished to make it unprofitable to employ
children in the manufacture of any kind of goods.").
43. Id. at 453 (quoting Frederick Green, The Child Labor Law and the Constitution, 1
ILL. L. BULL. 6 (1917)). Another critic of plans to use the Commerce Clause to support a
federal child labor law was former President (1909-1913) and future Chief Justice (19211930) William Howard Taft who, in his text on constitutional issues, wrote:
Bills have been urged upon Congress to forbid interstate commerce in goods
made by child labor. Such proposed legislation has failed chiefly because it
was thought beyond the Federal power. The distinction between the power
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Opponents had already managed to delay passage of the bill
for one year," maneuvering in March 1915 to keep it from
reaching the Senate floor before Congress adjourned. 45 In 1916,
however, the bill gained the support of President Woodrow
Wilson. 46 Wilson, who had earlier expressed his belief that such
a bill would exceed Congress' authority under the Commerce
Clause 47 and had maintained a cool neutrality toward the measure, 48 changed his views for political reasons. With the Progressive Party in disarray following Theodore Roosevelt's return to
the Republicans, Wilson hoped to attract former Progressives to
the Democratic Party by convincing them that the Democrats

exercised in enacting the pure food bill and that which would have been
necessary in the case of the child labor bill is that Congress in the former
is only preventing interstate commerce from being a vehicle for conveyance
of something which would be injurious to people at its destination, and it
might properly decline to permit the use of interstate commerce for that
detrimental result. In the latter case, Congress would be using its regulative
power of interstate commerce not to effect any result of interstate commerce ....
The proposed law is to be enforced to discourage the making of
articles by child labor in the State from which the articles were shipped. In
other words, it seeks indirectly and by duress, to compel the States to pass
a certain kind of legislation that is completely within their discretion to
enact or not. . . . Such an attempt of Congress to use its power of regulating
such Commerce to suppress the use of child labor in the State of shipment
would be a clear usurpation of that State's rights.
WILLIAM H. TAFT, POPULAR GOVERNMENT 142-43 (1913).
44. WALTER I.

TRATTNER, CRUSADE FOR THE CHILDREN: A

HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL

CHILD LABOR COMMITTEE AND CHILD LABOR REFORM IN AMERICA

124-27 (1970).

45. Id at 126-27. The session was nearing its end when the Senate Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce favorably reported the bill, H.R. 12,292, 63d Cong., 3d
Sess. (1915), which had already passed the House by a 233-43 vote on February 15. S.
REP. No. 1050, 63d Cong., 3d Sess. 1-2 (1915); 52 CONG. REc. 3836, 4911 (1915). Because of
the short time remaining in the session and the crowded Senate calendar, managers of
the bill sought to bring it directly to the Senate floor. To do so, however, required
unanimous consent, and Senator Lee Overman of North Carolina refused to consent.
Three days later, on March 4, 1915, Congress adjourned. 52 CONG. REC. 5509; TRATTNER,

supra note 44, at 126-27.
46. TRATTNER, supra note 44, at 129-30.

47. Wilson's position had not changed since 1908 when, as a political scientist, he had
written of the Beveridge bill:
The proposed federal legislation ... affords a striking example of a tendency
to carry Congressional power over interstate commerce beyond the utmost
boundaries of reasonable and honest inference. If the power to regulate
commerce between the states can be stretched to include regulation of labor
in mills and factories, it can be made to embrace every particular of .the
industrial organization and action of the country.
Id at 121-22 (quoting
STATES 179 (1908)).

48. Id. at 125-27.

WOODROW

WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT

IN THE UNITED
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were now the leading party urging social reform. 49 Wilson called
a meeting of Democratic congressional leaders, and soon thereafter, the Democratic Caucus placed the bill on its list of priority
legislation.0 The Senate passed the bill on August 8, 1916, by a
52-12 vote, with thirty-one senators abstaining, 1 and on Septem52
ber 1, President Wilson signed the bill into law.
The victory for opponents of child labor was to prove shortlived, however. In mid-August of 1917, even before the new law
was to take effect on September 1, a father, on behalf of himself
and his two minor sons, filed a lawsuit in federal district court
seeking an injunction against the Act's enforcement.P The district
court held the Act unconstitutional, 4 and on June 3, 1918, the
Supreme Court affirmed on appeal by a five-to-four vote in
Hammer v. Dagenhart.55
The language of the majority's opinion in Hammer echoed the
sentiment of earlier critics of the bill. Distinguishing the Child
Labor Act from earlier congressional actions under the Commerce
Clause, the Court declared that Congress' regulatory authority
extended only to those instances in which the act of interstate
transportation of an article was necessary to the accomplishment
of a harmful result.- In the case of child labor, the production
process, not the transportation process, caused the harmful result.
Therefore, the Court ruled, the child labor issue remained for
57
the states, rather than the federal government, to regulate.
Congress' First Attempt: The War Power
The public and press reactions to the Court's decision in
Hammer v. Dagenharts were overwhelmingly negative. 59 The

49. Id. at 129-30.

50. Id. at 130.
51. 53 CONG. REC. 12,313 (1916).
52. TRATTNER, supra note 44, at 131. The House passed the bill on January 15, 1916,

by a 343-46 vote. Id. at 128.
53. TRATTNER, supra note 44, at 134-35; Cushman, supra note 37, at 455.
54. Judge James E. Boyd decided the case from the bench; no opinion was written at
the district court level. TRATTNER, supra note 44, at 135.
55. 247 U.S. 251, 281 (1918).
56. Id. at 271.
57. Id. at 272. Moreover, responding to the Solicitor General's argument that the unfair
competition between states that employed child labor and those that did not was sufficient
to justify a congressional response under the Commerce Clause, the Court declared that
the Framers did not intend the clause to give Congress authority to equalize conditions

that may give one state an economic advantage over others. Id. at 273.
58. 247 U.S. 251.
59. Bruce, supra note 40, at 89 (noting "the caustic if not contemptuous references in
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response in Congress was no less severe, as legislators immediately began looking for a way to reverse the effects of the Court's
decision6 0 After all, the Court had not held that child labor could
not be regulated, or even that it could not be regulated through
Federal legislation. It merely said that Congress could not regulate child labor via the Commerce Clause.6' The problem facing
Congress, therefore, was one of constitutional interpretation, that
is, how to employ federal power to attack child labor without
running afoul of the limitations placed on federal power by the
Court's reading of the Constitution.
One commentator, Andrew A. Bruce of the University of Minnesota, recommended that Congress try a direct approach to the
problem: rather than attempting to discourage the use of child
labor through indirect measures such as taxation or restrictions
on interstate commerce, Congress should directly prohibit the
employment of child labor by claiming a parens patriae interest
in the well-being of the nation's children and the power to protect
that interest under the Fourteenth Amendment:
Surely the framers of the constitution never intended that an
indirect power of regulation could accomplish that which a
direct action could not constitutionally accomplish, and that
local self-government could be overthrown by indirection but
not by direction.
Congress then, it would seem, if it should act at all in the
matter, should act directly. It should take the broad position
that the protection of the health and of the lives and of the
morals of its citizens is as much a matter of national concern
as the protection of the currency and of the flag; that the
protection of the health and lives of its citizens while at home
is as much within its province as their protection while abroad.62
Bruce's argument, in effect, was that if an indirect approach
would be constitutional, a direct approach must be as well. The

the magazines and public press to the majority that concurred" in the decision); see also
44, at 137 (noting that "[leaders in and out of Congress, students
of the Constitution, American journalists, and most newspapers criticized the ruling" but
that "[i]n the Southern textile districts the decision brought cheers and rejoicing").
60. Edward F. Waite, The Child Labor Amendment, 9 MINN. L. REV. 179, 182 (1925); see
also 56 CONG. REc. 7692 (1918) (statement of Rep. Meyer London (Soc.-N.Y.)) (declaring
that "if this decision remains the law of the land it will be impossible for the National
Legislature, for Congress, to cure by legislation any of the social or industrial evils which
legislation in all civilized countries of the world tries to meet").
61. TRATTNER, supra note 44, at 136-37.
62. Bruce, supra note 40, at 100.
TRATTNER, supra note
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constitutionality of even an indirect approach, however, remained
unproven. Moreover, although any of. several indirect approaches
might arguably have a basis in the text of the Constitution and
Court precedents, a law directly outlawing child labor would, as
Bruce admitted, require a broad new construction of the Fourteenth Amendment.6 Congress never even considered seriously
such a direct challenge to the Court's decision.
Several other approaches received a more favorable hearing
in Congress, including proposals for a constitutional amendment
64
and for use of the federal taxing power to curtail child labor.
Time was needed, however, to study the various alternatives,
and in the interim, child laborers would be left without federal
5
protection
With the help of the American Federation of Labor and the
approval of President Wilson, the National Child Labor Committee drafted a bill that it hoped would cover this interim period.
The bill contained the same standards as the Child Labor Act
previously struck down by the Court, but instead of the Commerce Clause, its authority derived from the emergency wartime
powers given to the federal government during World War J.66
The idea seemed a good one, given the constitutional vagueness
concerning the extent of the war powers. 67 As one child labor
foe wrote later, reflecting on the wartime child labor bill,

63. Id. at 99.
64. TRATTNER, supra note 44, at 138.
65. Id.
66. H.R. 12,767, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. (1918). The government also took a more limited
step to reduce child labor. On July 19, 1918, the War Labor Policies Board adopted a
resolution making the Secretary of Labor responsible for the enforcement of a clause, to
be placed in all government contracts, which provided that government contractors would
not directly or indirectly employ any child under the age of 14 years or permit any child
between the ages of 14 and 16 to work more than eight hours in any one day, more than
six days in any one week, or before 6 a.m. or after 7 p.m. By simply exercising its right

to enter into contracts, the federal government was thus able to prohibit child labor at
least with respect to government contractors-a sizable category particularly during the
war-without invoking any constitutional questions. William C. Jones, The Child Labor
Decision, 6 CAL. L. REV. 395, 416-17 (1918); see also TRATTNER, supra note 44, at 138
(noting that future Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter was then serving as the
head of the War Labor Policies Board).
67. Under Article I, S 8, Congress has the power to declare war, to raise and support
armies, to maintain a navy, to make rules for the regulation of the land and naval forces,
and to provide for organizing, arming, disciplining, and calling forth the militia. U.S.
CONST. art. I, S8. Commentators have interpreted this constitutional provision to give
Congress wide powers during war in order to wage war effectively. James M. Hirschorn,
The Separate Community: Military Uniqueness and Serviceman's ConstitutionalRights, 62
N.C. L. REV. 177, 213 (1984).
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Whatever the people at large conceive to be necessary to the
national interest can be done at their instance or with their
approval under the war power-though it often must be done
by stretching pretty far the doctrine of implied powers, or
even in defiance of the constitution itself.P
In its wartime guise, the bill's purpose was stated as "conserving
the manpower of the Nation and thereby more effectively providing for the national security and defense." 69 If passed, it would
70
be effective until six months after the war's end.
The bill was doomed, however, not by constitutional infirmities
but rather by poor timing.7'1 Before Congress could consider the
measure, the war ended on November 11, 1918, and with it ended
the possibility of citing the military crisis to justify federal
regulation of child labor.7 2
Although the question of whether such an approach would have
succeeded remains open, the courts traditionally have shown
great deference toward actions justified by arguments of military
necessity, even if no such necessity actually existed.73 That a
wartime child labor act could have survived a court test is
possible, and perhaps likely.
Congress' Second Attempt: The Taxation Power
The war's end sent congressional opponents of child labor back
to the drawing board. With federal action under the commerce
power declared unconstitutional and action under the war power
no longer an available option, Congress turned to another of its
74
most powerful weapons: the power to lay and collect taxes.

68. RAYMOND G. FULLER, CHILD LABOR AND THE CONSTITUTION 279 (Arno Press 1974)
(1923).
69. TRATTNER, supra note 44, at 138-39 (quoting H.R. 12,767, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. (1918)).
70. Id. at 139.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. One may find a more recent, and infamous, example of this deference in the case
of Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), in which the Supreme Court upheld
laws requiring the internment of Americans of Japanese ancestry during World War II,
citing the exigencies of war. See also Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986)
(upholding Air Force regulation prohibiting the wearing of religious headgear while on
duty indoors).
74. The Constitution provides: "The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect
Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence
and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be

uniform throughout the United States:' U.S. CONST. art. I, S 8.
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On November 15, 1918, only four days after the armistice,
Senator Atlee Pomerene (D-Ohio) introduced an amendment to
the 1918 Revenue bill to place a ten percent excise tax on the
net profits of all mills, canneries, work shops, factories, manufacturing establishments, mines, or quarries employing child labor
contrary to the specific standards laid down in the proposal.7 5
The proposal included an exception, however, for cases in which
an employer hired a child without being aware of the child's
age. 76 The measure was a frank attempt to eliminate through
taxation a perceived injustice that, under the Supreme Court's
ruling, Congress could not abolish more directly via the commerce
77
power.
The language of the tax proposal itself, and the circumstances
of its passage, made clear that its purpose was to prohibit child
labor, not to raise revenue. 78 From a constitutional standpoint,
the issue was whether this was an allowable use of the taxing
power.
The bill faced little opposition within Congress itself as opponents of federal child labor legislation, seeing the bill's political
popularity, decided it would be a waste of time and money to
fight its passage. Instead, they decided to bide their time and
challenge the tax in the courts. 79 Some critics outside Congress,
however, were quick to note the bill's constitutional shortcomings.
Andrew Bruce, for example, argued that by passing such a bill,
Congress would be asserting a claim that the taxing power of
the federal government, via the "provide for the common Defence
and general Welfare" language in Article I, Section 8 of the
Constitution, 80 gave Congress the power to tax out of existence
any practice of which it disapproved, and thus by indirect means
to dictate the internal policies of the states. This interpretation
of the clause, he argued, was flawed.8 '
At the time of the adoption of the Constitution, Bruce noted,
the original states were jealous of one another and fearful of the

75. 56 CONG. Ruc. 11,560 (1918) (Sen. Pomerene proposing amendment to H.R. 12,863,
65th Cong., 2d Sess. (1918)).

76. Id.; see also Thomas Reed Powell, Child Labor, Congress, and the Constitution, 1
N.C. L. REV. 61, 69 (1922).
77. TRATTNER, supra note 44, at 140.

78. William A. Sutherland, The Child Labor Cases and the Constitution, 8 CORNELL L.Q.
338, 351 (1923).
79. TRATTNER, supra note 44, at 140.

80. U.S. CONST. art. I, S 8.
81. Bruce, supra note 40, at 101-02.
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power of the new government they were creating for themselves.
The distrust was such that the states insisted upon the addition
of a Bill of Rights with an express statement that powers not
granted to the federal government should be reserved to the
states. Additionally, they requested the inclusion of a statement
within the Constitution itself prohibiting Congress from levying
any tax upon exports, which would interfere with the marketing
of states' domestic products. Given the states' concerns, Bruce
argued, they could not have intended that courts construe the
language giving Congress the power to tax so as to give a
temporary majority in Congress an avenue to bypass those safeguards of the states' liberties.Y
Instead, he suggested, the federal taxing power was intended
merely as a means of raising money for the public defense and
the promotion of the public welfare, not as a weapon to force
the federal will upon the states.P Congress, however, claimed
that its power to tax did indeed include the power to destroys'
This notion was not novel; Alexander Hamilton had stated a
similar view in The Federalist No. 12 when he discussed the
85
favorable implications of taxing liquor imports.
Supporters of the child labor tax could also point to three
recent cases that appeared to lend constitutional legitimacy to
the tax plan. In Veazie Bank v. Fenno,8 the Supreme Court held
that the courts could not inquire into the motives of Congress in
matters of taxation, nor seek to discover whether the true purpose of a tax was to destroy rather than to raise revenue.8

82. Id. at 102.
83. Id.
84. TRATTNER, supra note 44, at 139; cf McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,
431 (1819) (Marshall, C.J.) (stating that "the power to tax involves the power to destroy").
85. THE FEDERALIST No. 12, at 75 (Alexander Hamilton) (Mod. Libr. 1937):
The single article of ardent spirits, under federal regulation, might be made
to furnish a considerable revenue. Upon a ratio to the importation into this
State, the whole quantity imported into the United States may be estimated
at four millions of gallons; which, at a shilling per gallon, would produce two
hundred thousand pounds. That article would well bear this rate of duty;
and if it should tend to diminish the consumption of it, such an effect would
be equally favorable to the agriculture, to the economy, to the morals, and
to the health of the society. There is, perhaps, nothing so much a subject of
national extravagance as these spirits.
86. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533 (1869) (upholding a tax of 10% on state bank notes).
87. Id. at 548. Although this may be true, Bruce argued, "honorable men should hardly
legislate upon this theory:' Bruce, supra note 40, at 103.
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Similarly, in McCray v. United States,8 the Supreme Court held
that courts could not control or limit the discretion of Congress
in the exercise of its constitutional power to levy excise taxes
solely because the former might deem the incidence of the tax
oppressive or even destructive. 89 Finally, in United States v.
Doremus, ° the Court held that a tax was not invalid merely
because another motive other than taxation, which was not shown
on the face of the act, might have contributed to its passage. 91
Although the constitutionality of the Child Labor Tax bill may
have been debatable, Congress clearly had some foundation in
the case law upon which to base the assertion that it could use
the taxation power in such a way. In debating the measure,
Congress had carefully studied Court precedents in attempting
to create a bill acceptable to the Court.9 2 The measure passed as
Title XII of the Revenue Act of 1918 and was signed into law
on February 24, 1919.93
Child labor proponents, after deciding not to participate in the
congressional debates, were quick to challenge the new measure
in the courts.94 This time congressional proponents of the law
were confident of a victory in the Supreme Court. After all, they
had discharged their duties with care, seriously deliberating in
search of a means of eliminating child labor without running afoul
of the Constitution, and painstakingly drafting a bill which they
felt would do just that. Senator William Kenyon, one of the
drafters of the tax law, remarked:
"I have absolute faith that the Supreme Court will sustain the
law. We studied every phase of the case when we drafted the

88. 195 U.S. 27 (1904) (upholding a tax on oleomargarine that hampered manufacturers'
ability to compete with butter producers).
89. Id. at 63-64; see also License Tax Cases, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 462, 471 (1866). In these
cases, the Court found:
[T]he power of Congress to tax is a very extensive power. It is given in the
Constitution, with only one exception and only two qualifications. Congress
cannot tax exports, and it must impose direct taxes by the rule of apportionment, and indirect taxes by the rule of uniformity. Thus limited, and
thus only, it reaches every subject, and may be exercised at discretion.

Id.
90. 249 U.S. 86 (1919) (upholding the Harrison Narcotic Drug Act of 1914, 38 Stat. 785,
which imposed a special tax on the importation, manufacture and sale or gift of opium
or coca leaves or their compounds or derivatives).
91. Id at 93-94.
92. See generally 57 CONG. REC. 609-21 (1918) (final Senate consideration of amendment
to Revenue bill); Id. at 3029-33 (House debate on amendment to Revenue bill).
93. Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-254, S 1200, ch. 18, 40 Stat. 1057, 1138-40 (1919).
94. See Drexel Furniture Co. v. Bailey, 276 F. 452 (W.D.N.C. 1921); George v. Bailey,
274 F. 639 (W.D.N.C. 1921), affd, 259 U.S. 20 (1922).
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section, including the point raised by Judge Boyd [the district
judge who struck down the tax], that it was an invasion of the
rights of the state. I do not believe that the Supreme Court
will rule against it. If it does, it will have to go back on every
one of its own decisions regarding the taxing power of the
95
United States."'
The Supreme Court, however, disagreed with the Senator's
analysis when it reviewed the case of Bailey v. Drexel Furniture
Co.,96 commonly referred to as the Child Labor Tax Case.97 Writing
the Court's opinion was Chief Justice Taft, who had earlier
expressed his disapproval of indirect federal actions that would
intrude on states' rights.9
Taft first conceded that the Court must construe the law and
interpret the intent of Congress from the language of the Act
alone, not from other sources." Even that method of construction
could not find the tax law constitutional, however, because the
measure was clearly intended as a penalty rather than as a
means of generating revenue.100
The Court noted three, major features of the Act leading to
that conclusion:
(1) The amount of the tax was not based on the extent to which
an employer used child labor. The percentage tax paid by a
business that employed one child for one day would be the same
as that paid by a business employing 500 children for the entire
year;
(2) An employer who was not aware that a worker was within
the specified age limit did not pay; only those who knowingly
employed child labor owed the tax. "Scienter," Taft noted, "is
associated with penalties not with taxes;"''1 1 and
(3) The employers' factories were subject to inspection not only
by the regular taxing officials of the Treasury Department, but
also by officials of the Labor Department, whose ordinary func102
tion was protecting the welfare of workers.

95. TRATTNER, supra note 44, at 141 (quoting Press Release, National Child Labor
Comm. Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. (May 8, 1919)).
96. Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S.-20, 20 n.1 (1922).
97. Id. at 20.
98. See supra note 43.

99. Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. at 36.
100. Id. at 36-37.
101. Id.

102. Id. at 37.
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"In the light of these features of the act," Taft wrote, "a court
must be blind not to see that the so-called tax is imposed to stop
the employment of children within the age limits prescribed. Its
03
prohibitory and regulatory effect and purpose are palpable.'

Although it struck down the child labor tax, the Supreme Court
at the same time acknowledged its willingness, in at least some
cases, to show deference to congressional interpretations of the
Constitution:
Out of a proper respect for the acts of a coordinate branch of
the Government, this court has gone far to sustain taxing acts
as such, even though there has been ground for suspecting
from the weight of the tax it was intended to destroy its
subject. But, in the act before us, the presumption of validity
cannot prevail, because the proof of the contrary is found on
the very face of its provisions. Grant the validity of this law,
and all that Congress would need to do, hereafter, in seeking
to take over to its control any one of the great number of
subjects of public interest, jurisdiction of which the States
have never parted with, and which are reserved to them by
the Tenth Amendment, would be to enact a detailed measure
of complete regulation of the subject and enforce it by a socalled tax upon departures from it. To give such magic to the
word "tax" would be to break down all constitutional limitation
of the powers of Congress
and completely wipe out the sov04
ereignty of the States.
What, then, had Congress done wrong in drafting its bill?
Apparently, its error was not in the method it chose to attack
the Court's Hammer ruling, but was rather in not being suffi-

103. Id.
104. Id. at 37-38. Chief Justice Taft preceded that statement, however, with a strong

statement concerning the Court's duty to act as a check on congressional action:
It is the high duty and function of this court in cases regularly brought to
its bar to decline to recognize or enforce seeming laws of Congress, dealing
with subjects not entrusted to Congress but left or committed by the supreme
law of the land to the control of the States. We can not avoid the duty even
though it require us to refuse to give effect to legislation designed to promote
the highest good. The good sought in unconstitutional legislation is an
insidious feature because it leads citizens and legislators of good purpose to
promote it without thought of the serious breach it will make in the ark of
our covenant or the harm which will come from breaking down recognized
standards. In the maintenance of local self government, on the one hand,
and the national power, on the other, our country has been able to endure
and prosper for near a century and a half.
Id. at 37.
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ciently subtle in pursuing its motives. The Court's opinion seemed
to suggest that the Justices were willing to forego close examination of the legislative history underlying a tax statute,10 5 but
when "Congress in the name of a tax which on the face of the act
is a penalty seeks to do the same thing [that it could not
accomplish through a direct penalty], . . . the effort must be
equally futile.' ' 0 6 Here, the inclusion in the Act of the provisions

criticized in Chief Justice Taft's opinion made it clear to the
Court, even without an examination of legislative history, that
Congress did not intend the Act as an ordinary revenue-producing
tax.
Arguably, Congress could have passed a new child labor tax
following the Court's decision in the Child Labor Tax Case that
would have addressed the Court's concerns. 107 Such a tax, for
example, might have required an employer to pay a fixed amount
for each hour of child labor employed, provided no exception for
unknowing employment of child labor, and left enforcement solely
in the hands of the Treasury. Such a law, however, would not
have fully accomplished Congress' purpose. Although such a
measure might have discouraged businesses from using child
labor on a large scale, employers using child labor for only a
small number of hours-small businesses or seasonal employers,
such as canneries-might have continued to find it profitable to
hire children. In some parts of the country, the difference in
labor costs between child and adult workers might have been so
great as to exceed the amount of the excise tax. In any case,
Congress declined to pursue such an option, choosing instead to
follow a course that appeared certain to bring favorable and
complete results: a constitutional amendment.
Congress' Third Attempt: A ConstitutionalAmendment
Congressmen had already proposed amendments several times
during their previous consideration of child labor measures, but
the defeat of the child labor tax law gave the prospect of an
amendment new life. Congress now appeared to have no better

105. Id. at 36 ("We must construe the law and interpret the intent and meaning of
Congress from the language of the act:').
106. Id. at 39 (emphasis added).
107. Cf Herman T. Reiling, Child Labor and FederalTaxation, 13 TAX MAG. 584 (1935)
(arguing that any constitutional attempt to regulate child labor would rest on "exceedingly
narrow" grounds).
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optionl °s The difficulty with a constitutional amendment was that
Congress could not act alone. To become part of the Constitution,
an amendment required not only a two-thirds vote of both houses
of Congress, but also ratification by three-quarters of the states. 10 9
At least one member of Congress argued that a simple amendment empowering Congress to outlaw child labor would not be
sufficient. What was needed, rather, was an overhaul of the
entire system of enacting constitutional amendments to give
Congress greater power to respond via amendment to situations
it perceived as requiring federal action."10 Others, however, argued that Congress was often unwilling to act as an interpreter
of the Constitution, preferring to pass legislation without serious
consideration of its constitutionality and leave constitutional anal-

108. See, e.g., 64 CONG. REC. 5345 (1923). Senator Joseph McCormick (R-Ind.) stated,
We have no recourse but to amend the Constitution for the sake of the
children who otherwise will be driven into the mills of the country to their
own injury and so to the hurt of their more fortunate and happier fellows. ... When we have done our work it will not be possible anywhere in
the United States, for a pittance, to buy or sell the birthright of any child
in this land.
Id.
109. U.S. CONST. art. V. At the time Congress adopted the amendment, it needed 36
states to ratify.
110. Representative London proposed a constitutional amendment process similar to
that of the New York State Constitution, which required an amendment to be approved
by two consecutive legislatures, then submitted for a referendum:
It is impossible to reconcile democratic institutions with an institution which
permits a bare majority of one or two of a court consisting of nine members
to override the will of the elected representatives of the people.
I share the opinion of those who believe that it was never intended
that the Supreme Court should have the power to declare acts of Congress
unconstitutional. Whatever the situation may be in that regard, the important
thing before us today is to make the fundamental law of the land more
flexible, more adapted to present conditions ...
[Even if a specific child labor amendment were to be adopted, t]he court
will continue to nullify [other social legislation enacted] by Congress and will
prevent it from giving legislative expression to the wishes of the people.
The stupendous economic and social changes of modern times emphasize the
necessity of harmonizing the legal structure of society with its industrial
needs.
The remedy lies in the direction of making the amendment provision of
the Constitution more elastic, s5 that the Constitution should be a living
organism, growing and expanding with the people.
The present cumbersome method of changing the Constitution should be
replaced with a simple and direct appeal to the people through a referendum,
either upon the initiative of Congress or upon the initiative of a part of the
people.
62 CONG. REC. 8773 (1922).
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ysis to the courts1 1 As such, Congress should not be trusted
with greater power to tamper with the Constitution itself.
Most, however, were willing to leave for future consideration
a broad amendment to meet the needs of the modern age, and
to settle instead for an amendment devoted solely to the child
labor problem." 2 The amendment read:

Section 1. The Congress shall have power to limit, regulate,
and prohibit the labor of persons under eighteen years of age.
Section 2. The power of the several States is unimpaired by
this article except that the operation of State laws shall be
suspended to the extent necessary
to give effect to legislation
3
enacted by the Congress."1
The proposal passed the House by a 297-69 vote on April 26,
1924, but not before a lively debate over whether federal control
of child labor was preferable to state control." 4 Senate debate

111. See, for example, the following discussion between Representatives Andrew J.
Montague (D-Va.), George Huddleston (D-Ala.), and Meyer London:
Mr. MONTAGUE. Is it not the tendency of the times for members in
legislative bodies, State and National, to pay less and less regard to the
Constitution, and to pass all questions of constitutionality to the courts, the
members of these legislative bodies thereby relieving themselves of their
obligation, and impairing the highest and most solemn political morality?
The Congress thus coerces the courts to pass upon such questions.
Mr. LONDON. But that is a most cowardly thing.
Mr. MONTAGUE. Of course it is. Congress is more blameworthy than the
courts.
Mr. LONDON. The legislator who deliberately votes for a law knowing
that the Supreme Court will declare it unconstitutional is false to himself
and false to his oath.
Mr. HUDDLESTON. But is it not true that under our present system
there is a great tendency to encourage the legislatures to ignore their
obligations to the Constitution and to put the whole question up to the
courts?
Mr. LONDON. Oh, when you permit the existence of an institution that
is out of tune with the demands of the times -the institution becomes a dead
letter or an obstruction, and despite the prohibition of contempt it invites
contempt. If it should be easier to amend the Constitution, it will become
impossible for the legislator to evade responsibility and to throw the blame
for defeating the will of the people upon the courts.
Id.
112. See TRATTNER, supra note 44, at 166.
113. H.J. Res. 184, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 43 Stat. 670 (1924). Before this language was
finally adopted, Congress rejected 23 other suggestions for the amendment's wording. In
all, senators and representatives from 14 different states offered 40 amendment proposals
in the three years after the Child Labor Tax Case decision. Charles C. Burlingham, The
Need for a Federal Child Labor Amendment, 21 A.B.A. J. 214, 215 (1935).
114. 65 CONG. REC. 7295 (1924).
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was no less active, filling nearly 100 pages of the Congressional

Record with speeches, evidence, and debate over the bill. 115 On
June 2, the Senate passed the resolution by a 61-23 vote-just
116
five favorable votes more than the necessary two-thirds.
Supporters of the amendment drafted it with care, to cover
every foreseeable contingency. They used the term "persons
under eighteen years of age" rather than "children" because
previous court cases had defined "child" in differing ways and

use of the word may have caused uncertainty in interpretating
the amendment."" Eighteen was chosen as the age limit rather
than sixteen, not because Congress wished to prohibit all em-

ployment up to that age, but rather to enable Congress to
regulate the employment of older children in particularly hazard-

ous occupations.",8 Finally, the amendment used the word "labor"
rather than "employment" because "to state it thus avoids all

possibility of the shufflings and evasions which might follow the
adoption of the latter word.""19
Although the final wording may have been popular with Congress, which stood to gain increased power from the amendment,
it did not sit well with the state legislatures that would correspondingly sacrifice some of their autonomy to Congress if they
voted in favor of ratification. In particular, critics attacked the

choice of the word "labor," interpreting it to give Congress the
power to prohibit chores performed by children at home rather
than merely industrial employment. 20 Although supporters of the

115. Id. at 9597-98, 9600.03, 9858-64, 9866-68, 9991-10,009, 10,073-126, 10,128-29, 10,13942.
116. Id. at 10,142. Fourteen of the 23 negative votes came from southern senators.
117. S. REP. No. 406, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1924).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 15; see also Burlingham, supra note 113, at 216 ("In industrial home work,
in the beet fields, frequently in canneries children who work are not employed in the
technical sense of the term.., but they labor from sun-up to sun-down.").
120. See statement of Rep. Christian W. Ramsmeyer (R-Iowa), who voted for the
amendment:
Under the proposed amendment Congress will have the power to regulate
the labor of a boy under the direction of his father as well as the employment
of the same boy when he works for a neighbor or stranger. . . . Congress
will have the power to "limit," "regulate" and "prohibit" the labor of girls
under 18 years of age in the homes and of boys under 18 years of age on
the farms.
65 CONG. REc. 7290 (1924).
It should be noted that Congress, prior to adopting the amendment, had been given
an opportunity to address such concerns. Two additions had been proposed to the
amendment:
(1) "But no law enacted under this article shall affect in any way the labor of any child
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amendment claimed that Congress had no such intent, opponents
responded that regardless of present intent, Congress might
eventually exercise the full authority granted by the amendment.121 Some went so far as to allege that the amendment was
a Socialist- or Communist-inspired plot to strip states and parents
of their authority.'2
Due to concerns such as those mentioned above, the amendment proposal quickly bogged down once it reached the state
legislatures. Loath to sacrifice a portion of their authority to the
federal government, thirteen states-enough to defeat ratification-had affirmatively rejected the amendment by March 5,
1925.121 Once again, by its refusal to settle for a measure that
would accomplish less than its entire goal, Congress had crafted
a measure that could not win acceptance-this time by the states,
rather than by the Court as had been the case with the tax law.
By 1937, only twenty-eight of the requisite thirty-six states had
ratified the amendment. Debate began over whether the 1924
amendment could still be ratified if some states reversed their
positions, because the amendment had been submitted to the
states more than thirteen years earlier.' 24

or children on the farm of the parent or parents." Id. at 7293.
(2) "That no law shall control the labor of any child in the house, or business, or on
the premises connected therewith, of the parent or parents." Id. at 7292.
Both additions, however, were rejected. Id. at 7292-93.
121. A.C. Campbell, The Child Labor Amendmt, 60 Am. L. REV. 254, 260-61 (1926)
("'It would be utter rashness for the country to institute a revolutionary change in
government on the plea that we should have confidence in the wisdom and prudence of
federal legislators. .

.

. We do not issue blank signed checks to others' ") (quoting the

Chairman of the National Comm. for the Rejection of the Twentieth Amendment, quoted
in 9 CONST. REV. 44, 51 (1925)).
122. Representative Victor Berger, a Socialist congressman who supported the amendment, may have fostered this idea by telling Congress, "It is a socialist amendment and
that is why I am for it." 65 CONG. REc. 7311 (1924) (statement of Rep. John J. McSwain
(D-S.C.) (quoting Berger (Soc.-Wis.)); see also id. at 10,007 (1924) (statement of Sen. William
H. King (D-Utah)):
In conversation with one of the leading Bolsheviks in the city of Moscow,
...I was remonstrating with him about the scheme of the Bolsheviks to
have the state take charge of the children. "Why", he said, "you are coming
to that" . . . . Then he said, "A number of socialists in the United States

...are back of the movement to amend your Constitution... and you will
transfer to the Federal Government the power which the Bolshevik Government is asserting now over the young people of the state"
Id.
123. Comment, Child Labor Legislation-Its Past, Present and Future, 7 FORDHAM L.
REV. 219, 221-22 (1938). The Supreme Court declined to answer the time limit question
in the 1939 case of Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 452 (1939).
124. Emerson S. Sturdevant et al., Note, What is the Status of the Child Labor

564

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:543

The Fourth Time is a Charm: A FamiliarApproach
By 1937, however, perhaps the more pertinent question was
whether the amendment was still necessary. The composition and
attitude of the Supreme Court had undergone a major reformation since the Hammer decision in 1918, and many observers
believed the time was ripe for a new child labor law grounded
in the Commerce Clause. 12
12
Despite the failure of his infamous "Court-packing" plan,
President Franklin D. Roosevelt succeeded, beginning in 1937, in

Amendment?, 26 GEO. L.J. 107, 112-18 (1937). During the interim, the federal government
had implemented some restrictions on child labor through the actions of the National
Recovery Administration (NRA), established under the National Industrial Recovery Act
of 1933, Pub. L. No. 67, 48 Stat. 195 (1933). Because of the relationship among adult
unemployment, low wages during the Depression, and child labor, the NRA issued codes
with a 16-year minimum working age in many industries and an 18-year minimum in
particularly hazardous occupations such as mining, logging, and sawmill operations. By
the fall of 1934, most American industries were operating under such restrictions. All
such restrictions were removed in May 1935, however, when the Supreme Court declared
the NRA unconstitutional in Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495
(1935).
125. See, e.g., Fred L. Kuhlmann, Note, Child Labor Amendment or Alternative Legislation?, 22 WASH. U. L.Q. 401, 401-06 (1937); Joseph B. Shapero, Note, The Proposed Child
Labor Amendment, 13 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 59, 62-63 (1937); James Barclay Smith, Note,
A Child Labor Amendment is Unnecessary, 27 CAL. L. REV. 15, 17-28 (1938); Comment,
supra note 123, at 233-35.
126. Angered by Supreme Court rulings striking down key New Deal legislation, see,
e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (striking down Bituminous Coal
Conservation Act of 1935); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) (striking down
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933); Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S.
495 (1935) (strikingdown NRA); and Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton R.R. Co., 295 U.S.
330 (1935) (striking down Railroad Retirement Act of 1934), Roosevelt proposed a bill to
permit the President, with Senate approval, to appoint an additional judge or justice to
any federal court when one of the court's members reached the age of 70 and did not
resign or retire. Roosevelt claimed the proposal was intended to help the Supreme Court
handle its workload, but this explanation was somewhat disingenuous-six Supreme Court
Justices were then over 70. By adding six Justices, even if the older Justices declined
to resign, Roosevelt could have turned his string of five-to-four defeats into ten-to-five
victories. H.R. Doc. No. 142, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 9-11 (1937), reprinted in 81 CONG. REC.
877, 893 (1937) (citing Roosevelt's message to Congress concerning reorganization of the
judiciary); see also C. HINMAN PRITCHETT, THE ROOSEVELT COURT: A STUDY IN JUDICIAL
POLITICS AND VALUES 8-9 (1948) (describing Roosevelt's explanation of his plan as "indirect
and maladroit" and discussing the controversy it engendered).
The Senate Judiciary Committee sternly rejected Roosevelt's proposal, denouncing the
bill as "a needless, futile, and utterly dangerous abandonment of constitutional princi-

pal[sic]."

SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REORGANIZATION OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY,

S. REP. No. 711, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1937). Although Roosevelt did not achieve his
complete goal legislatively, his actions were not without effect. Arguably, the President's
threat of political retaliation against the Court helped induce Justice Owen J. Roberts
to change his view of the Commerce Clause and to look more favorably upon New Deal
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rebuilding the Court with Justices more likely to favor a widereaching commerce power.12 The new Justices' outlook began to
make itself apparent immediately in decisions expanding the
federal government's power. One case in particular, Kentucky
Whip & Collar Co. v. Illinois Central Railroad Co.,128 in which
the Court upheld a federal statute barring the shipment of goods
made with convict labor into states that had laws against the
sale of such goods, 12 suggested that the Court might be ready
to reconsider a use of the commerce power to restrict child
labor.1 o
The Kentucky Whip case, however, left opponents of child labor
with a problem. The statute upheld in that case had barred
shipments of convict-made goods only into states with laws prohibiting their sale. Thus, a comparable child labor bill would
require cooperation of the states in outlawing the sale of goods
made with child labor. 13 The bill that eventually passed, however,
ignored this problem-constitutionally, it was a twin of the Act
the Court had struck down in Hammer. 32 Congress again was
swinging for the fences.
That bill, the Fair Labor Standards bill,as was actually a

hybrid. In proposing the measure, President Roosevelt combined

legislation (the so-called "switch in time that saved nine," a reference first made in a
letter from Edwin Corwin to Attorney General Homer Cummings (May 19, 1937) (available
in Corwin Manuscripts, Princeton University), quoted in GERALD GUNTHER, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 533 (10th ed. 1980)). It is equally possible, however,

that Roberts' "switch" was motivated simply by the popularity of the New Deal. Whatever
its motivation, it cleared the way for far greater federal power relative to the states.
127. For Roosevelt, time accomplished what legislation could not-within four years,
resignations and retirements gave him the opportunity to appoint Justices Hugo Black,
Stanley Reed, Felix Frankfurter, William 0. Douglas, Frank Murphy, James Byrnes, and
Robert Jackson. Roosevelt also elevated Harlan Stone from Associate to Chief Justice.
Leaving the Court were Charles E. Hughes, James C. McReynolds, Louis D. Brandeis,
Pierce Butler, George Sutherland, Benjamin N. Cardozo, and Willis Van Devanter.
128. 299 U.S. 334 (1937).
129. Ashhurst-Sumners Act, ch. 412, Pub. L. No. 74-215, 49 Stat. 494 (1935) (current
version at 18 U.S.C. SS1761-1762 (1988)).
130. In seeking to harmonize Kentucky Whip with Hammer, however, the Court restated
its opinion that the evil to be corrected by Commerce Clause legislation must be
accomplished by the completion of interstate shipment. Kentucky Whip, 299 U.S. at 350.
131. Such a bill, the Wheeler-Johnson bill, was in fact introduced in March, 1937. S.
2226, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937), in To Regulate the Products of Child Labor: Hearings
Before the Senate Comm. on Interstate Commerce, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1937).
132. Compare Fair Labor Standards bill, ch. 676, Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat 1060 (1938)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. SS 201-219, 557 (1988)) with Act of Sept. 1, 1916, ch.
432, 39 Stat. 675 (1916).
133. Also referred to as the Black-Connery Wages and Hours bill, S.2475, 75th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1937); H.R. 7200, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937).
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child labor regulations with his proposals for minimum wage and
maximum hours legislation, possibly believing that such a combined measure would get through Congress more easily. As one
legislator noted, the child labor provisions were added as a
sweetener "because it was desired to say to Senators, 'When you
vote against this bill you are also voting against the prohibition
of child labor.' "s'

As passed, the Fair Labor Standards Act's child labor provisions prohibited the shipment in interstate commerce of goods
made at a location employing child labor within thirty days prior
to shipment. As such, the provisions echoed the original KeatingOwen Child Labor Law, 135 making the Act a direct challenge to
Hammer.
The Court considered the constitutionality of the Act in United
States v. Darby.13 In upholding the Act, the Supreme Court did
not attempt to reconcile its decision with Hammer as it had in
Kentucky Whip. Instead, the unanimous Court overruled Hammer,
saying, "The reasoning and conclusion of the Court's opinion
there cannot be reconciled with the conclusion which we have
reached, that the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause
is plenary to exclude any article from interstate commerce subject only to the specific prohibitions of the Constitution."'137 The
Court added:
The conclusion is inescapable that Hammer v. Dagenhart,was
a departure from the principles which have prevailed in the
interpretation of the Commerce Clause both before and since
the decision and that such vitality, as a precedent, as it then
had has long since been exhausted. It should be and now is
overruled.138
The Court paid no heed to the Tenth Amendment warning
that "[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to
the States respectively, or to the people." 139 The Amendment,
the Court said, is nothing more than "a truism that all is retained
134. TRATTNER, supra note 44, at 203 (quoting Jeremy P. Felt, The Child Labor
Provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act 9 (Apr. 20, 1968) (paper delivered at the
Annual Meeting of the Organization of American Historians)).
135. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
136. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
137. Id. at 116.
138. Id. at 116-17.
139. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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which has not been surrendered. ' 140 The Court held that the
Amendment has little value in defining the relationship between
the federal government and the states, that it was added only
to allay the states' fears that the new national government might
seek to exercise powers not granted, and that the states might
41
not be able to exercise fully their reserved powers.
Analysis of Congress' Efforts
After more than twenty years, Congress finally crafted a
"constitutionar' federal regulation of child labor that was, in all
important respects, identical to its initial "unconstitutional" effort. The changes in the interim that made the final statute more
acceptable than the first were not congressional changes in constitutional interpretation, wording, or behavior, but rather jurisprudential changes in the Court itself. Congress' triumph was
not due to its mastery of constitutional thought or its ability to
nimbly sidestep the Court's objections, but rather to its persistence, like that of a punch-drunk fighter who keeps coming back
for more until his more powerful opponent dies of old age and
is carried from the ring.
Nonetheless, Congress in the end had successfully challenged
and reversed a Supreme'Court decision of which it disapproved
and, in doing so, had won a new interpretation of the Commerce
Clause that greatly enhanced the power of the federal government relative to the states. Congress also learned some lessons
regarding approaches to challenging the Court that do not work.
Clearly, Congress could not openly express its intent, as shown
by the failure of the child labor tax. The Court showed it was
willing to wink at Congress' possible behind-the-scenes motives,
but a bill that showed on its face an intent to overturn a recent
Court ruling was unlikely to meet with success. Such a statute,
showing disrespect for the Court, which had made the prior
decision, 142 perhaps treaded too close to the Court's later-enun-

140. Darby, 312 U.S. at 124.
141. Id at 123-24. The Court chose to ignore the possibility that if the amendment
succeeded in allaying the states' fears, the states in ratifying it may have intended it to
have some practical protective value.
142. See, for example, the language of the defendant's argument in the Child Labor
Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20, 28-29 (1922), which apparently fell upon fertile ground:
Notwithstanding this solemn decision by this court [inHammer], Congress
in its enactment of the Federal Revenue Act of 1918, the consideration of
which began soon after the decision in Hammer v. Dagenhart, prescribed
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ciated view of its role as the supreme interpreter of the Constitution. Although Congress used great care in attempting to find
a different constitutional basis for its actions than the one the
Court had rejected in Hammer, the final product of that interpretation was doomed to failure.
Similarly, in the case of the Child Labor Amendment to the
Constitution, Congress again showed too much of its hand on the
face of the measure. Distrusting the state legislatures to act in
a manner it deemed proper, Congress wanted to fashion for itself
the broadest possible powers so that it could deal with any
"evasion" by state legislatures or individuals. In sowing distrust,
however, Congress reaped distrust in return. A sufficient number
of states remained unsure of Congress' intentions, or its willingness to stay within the limitations promised in Congress' statements but not in its amendment proposal. Congress asked the
states for a "blank check"; the states refused to sign it.
Civil Rights Act of 1964
The Initial Decision

Congress' enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,113 like its
1
earlier attempts to reverse Hammer v. Dagenhart,
4 was an action

that appeared to conflict with prevailing Supreme Court constitutional interpretation. One major difference existed, however,
between the two situations. Whereas Congress had begun almost

precisely the same minimum ages and the same working hours which it had
prescribed in the statute of 1916, and provided that the employer operating
a mine, quarry, mill, cannery or factory, who saw fit to disregard the will
of Congress in his employment of children, should, instead of having his
goods shut out of interstate commerce, as the statute of 1916 had provided,
be subjected to a so-called tax of ten per cent on all the profits of his
business additional to all other taxes.
It needs no reference to the debates to ascertain the purpose of Congress
in this enactment, and the direct effect of such enactment-if it is to have
validity and effect at all. If recourse to the debates were necessary or
desirable, it shows the frankest and clearest expression of the congressional
will and purpose.
It does not consist with the dignity that should characterize arguments in
this court to discuss, as if it were an uncertain thing, the purpose and effect
of this statute. Of course, it is not a revenue statute, and or course it is an
attempt to impose upon all the citizens in all the States the congressional
will ....
143. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28
U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C. (1988)).
144. 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
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immediately to look for responses to the Court's child labor
decision, the Civil Rights Act followed the Court decision it

"overruled" by more than three-quarters of a century.
Congress passed its first attempt at a civil rights measure
soon after the end of the War Between the States: the Civil
Rights or Enforcement Act of April 9, 1866.145 That Act was
followed by the Slave Kidnaping Act, 46 the Peonage Abolition
Act of March 2, 1867,147 the Act of May 31, 1870,'4 and the AntiLynching Act of April 20, 1871.149 Although all these acts dealt
with civil rights and related issues, none dealt with the problem
of eliminating discrimination in public accommodations.'o The
Civil Rights Act of March 1, 1875,151 first addressed that issue,
making it unlawful to deny a person the enjoyment of accommodations at inns, on public transportation, in theaters, or at
similar facilities on the basis of race.5 2 The Act was based on

145. Ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1982, 1987-1992 (1988))
(guaranteeing all people equal property rights).
146. Ch. 86, 14 Stat. 50 (1866) (prohibiting kidnapping or enticing persons to be sold
into slavery).
147. Ch. 187, 14 Stat. 546 (1867) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. S 1994 (1988)):
[Tihe holding of any person to service or labor under the system known as
peonage is hereby declared to be unlawful, and the same is hereby declared
to be unlawful, and the same is hereby abolished and forever prohibited...
in any . . . Territory or State of the United States; and all acts, laws,
resolutions, orders, regulations, or usages. . of any ... Territory or State
.... which have heretofore established, maintained, or enforced, or by virtue
of which any attempt shall hereafter be made to establish, maintain, or
enforce, directly or indirectly, the voluntary or involuntary service or labor
of any persons as peons, in liquidation of any debt or obligation, or otherwise,
be, and the same are hereby, declared null and void ....
148. Ch. 114, SS 1-22, 16 Stat. 140, 141, 144 (1870) (current version at 42 U.S.C. SS 1971,
1987-1991 (1988)) (providing criminal sanctions for violations of federal rights).
149. Also referred to as the "Ku Klux Klan Act," Ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (current
version at 42 U.S.C. SS 1983, 1985-1986 (1988)) (providing a federal remedy for persons
injured due to attacks or other civil rights violations by the Klan and similar groups).
150. For a general discussion of post-Civil War civil rights legislation, see Eugene
Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MICH. L. REV. 1323, 132336 (1952).
151. Ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335 (1875) (SS 1-2 declared unconstitutional in the Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); SS3-4 repealed, Ch. 645, S 21, 62 Stat. 862 (1948); S 5 eliminated,
see 42 U.S.C. § 1984 (1988)).
152. The Act stated, in pertinent part:
That all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall be
entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages,
facilities, and privileges of inns, public conveyances on land or water, theaters, and other places of public amusement; subject only to the conditions
and limitations established by law, and applicable alike to citizens of every
race and color, regardless of any previous condition of servitude.
That any person who shall violate the foregoing section by denying to any
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the Fourteenth Amendment, one of the newly-minted "Civil War
Amendments" to the Constitution, which provides in part: "All
persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States ....
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States . . .
Although the 1875 Act was certainly morally correct, and
perhaps legally correct as well, it was ahead of its time insofar
as its likelihood of surviving a constitutional challenge. In the
Civil Rights Cases,1 64 the Court struck down the Act, holding that
the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits only state action, not private action. 155 The Amendment therefore did not give the federal
government the power to pass such a law; only the states could
do so.,
Congress Responds: A Constitutional Circumvention
Following the passage of the ill-fated Civil Rights Act of 1875,
eighty-two years passed before Congress again enacted major
legislation in the civil rights field. 57 Moreover, not until 1963 did
a call come for a new law to prevent discrimination in public
accommodations.1e In its final form, the Civil Rights Act of 1964

citizen, except for reasons by law applicable to citizens of every race and
color, and regardless of any previous condition of servitude, the full enjoyment of any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, or privileges in
said section enumerated ....
Id. §§ 1-2, 18 Stat. at 336.
153. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, S 1.
154. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
155. Id. at 11. The Court also held that "slavery," as outlawed in the Thirteenth
Amendment, did not encompass discrimination in general. Id. at 24.
156. "It should be noted that [the Supreme Court's decision in the Civil Rights Cases]
was handed down 10 years before the adoption of State laws, statutes, or ordinances
requiring segregation. . . . []n 1885 a Negro could use railroad, dining, and saloon
facilities without discrimination in the Carolinas, Virginia, and Georgia." S. REP. No. 872,
88th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1964), rerprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2355, 2364-65. Louisiana
and Alabama did not repeal statutes prohibiting discrimination in certain public accommodations until 1954 and 1959, respectively. Id.
157. Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315, 71 Stat. 634 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.), followed three years later by the Civil
Rights Act of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-449, 74 Stat. 86 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 18 U.S.C., 20 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
158. The call came from President John F. Kennedy who, on June 19, 1963, sent the
Congress a proposed bill
to promote the general welfare by eliminating discrimination based on race,
color, religion, or national origin in . . .public accommodations through the
exercise by Congress of the powers conferred upon it . . . [,] to enforce the
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contained provisions similar to those struck down in the Civil
Rights Cases. The provisions began in section 201(a) of the Act,
which provided: "All persons shall be entitled to the full and
equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public accommodation, as defined in this section, without discrimination or
segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national
origin."''5 9 The definition encompassed inns, hotels, motels, restaurants, motion picture houses, and any establishment the operations of which affected commerce 16 0 or the segregation of which
was supported by state action.' 61
Both the House and Senate committees conducted extensive
hearings on President John F. Kennedy's proposal. In the
Senate, the Commerce Committee held twenty-three separate
sessions to consider the public accommodations provisions of
Senate bill 1732,162 reviewing statements from forty witnesses,
including government officials, 163 religious leaders, 64 and oth-

provisions of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments, to regulate commerce
among the several States, and to make laws necessary and proper to execute
the powers conferred upon it by the Constitution.
H.R. Doc. No. 124, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1963) (containing President Kennedy's message
to Congress regarding the bill).
Kennedy's proposals were introduced in the House as H.R. 7152, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1963), and in the Senate as two separate bills, S. 1731, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963),
containing the entire administration proposal, and S. 1732, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963),
dealing solely with public accommodations. The Senate Judiciary Committee conducted
hearings on S.1731, while the Senate Committee on Commerce conducted hearings on S.
1732. The House Judiciary Committee conducted hearings on the House measure.
159. Pub. L. No. 88-352, S 201(a), 78 Stat. 241, 243 (1964) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. 5 2000a(a) (1988)).
160. The Act defined the following establishments as "affecting commerce": (1) inns,
hotels, motels, etc., providing lodging to transient guests, other than small guest houses;
(2) restaurants, cafeterias, etc., serving interstate travellers, or offering, as a substantial
portion of the food they serve or the products they sell, items that have "moved in
commerce"; and (3) theaters, concert halls, sports arenas, etc., customarily presenting
films, performances, athletic teams, or other entertainment which "move in commerce."
Id. S201(c), 78 Stat. at 243 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. S 2000a(c)).
161. Id. SS 201-207, 78 Stat. at 243-46 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. S2000a).
162. Civil Rights - Public Accommodations: Hearings on S. 1782 Before the Senate Comm.
onCommerce, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
163. Among them were United States Attorney General Robert Kennedy, Secretary
of State Dean Rusk, Secretary of Labor Willard Wirtz, Assistant Attorney General for
Civil Rights Burke Marshall, and the governors of South Carolina, Georgia, Florida,
Alabama, and Mississippi. See S. REP. No. 872, supra note 156, at 11-12, reprintedin 1964
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2366.
164. Religious leaders included Dr. Eugene Carson Blake of the National Council of
Churches, Rabbi Irwin Blank of the Synagogue Council of America, and Father John F.
Cronin of the National Catholic Welfare Conference. Id.
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ers.165 The House Judiciary Committee was equally thorough,

with one subcommittee spending twenty-two days in hearings
and an additional seventeen days in executive session. 16
Constitutionally, the principal debate concerned whether the
bill would be based on the Fourteenth Amendment, placing it
squarely in opposition to the Civil Rights Cases, or on some other
ground, such as the increasingly expansive commerce power. 167
That concern was particularly apparent in the hearings before
the Senate Commerce Committee on Senate bill 1732, during
which several senators expressed their concern that by basing
its action on the Commerce Clause, Congress would be "stretching the Constitution" to allow federal control over noneconomic
areas more properly left in state hands.," Others favored the
Fourteenth Amendment not because of concern for states' rights,
but rather because they believed the Fourteenth Amendment's
lofty language, speaking of equal protection of the law, was more
suitable to Congress' purpose.6 9 As one Senator noted,

165. For example, NAACP Executive Secretary Roy Wilkins, NFL Commissioner Peter
Rozeile, and Baseball Commissioner Ford Frick. Id.
166. H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1964), reprintedin 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2391, 2392.
167. As proposed by President Kennedy, the bill contained references to both grounds,
but a commerce power focus predominated:
[F]or example, the proposed title was "Interstate Public Accommodations
Act"; the introductory series of findings dealt almost entirely with commerce;
the commerce emphases, and the afterthought nature of the Fourteenth
Amendment reliance, were highlighted by the final "finding" that the "burdens on and obstructions to commerce which are described above can best
be removed by invoking the powers of Congress under the Fourteenth
Amendment and the commerce clause of the Constitution"; and the coverage
provisions were entirely in commerce terms.
GERALD GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 159 n.4 (11th ed. 1985).
168. Civil Rights-Public Accommodations: Hearingson S. 1732 Before the Senate Comm.
on Commerce, supra note 162, part 1, at 66-67 (statement of Sen. A.S. Mike Monroney (DOkla.)); id. at 91 (statement of Sen. Strom Thurmond (D-S.C.)).
169. Compare, for example, the statements in the Senate Commerce Committee hearings of United States Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, supporting the President's
proposal, and Sen. John S. Cooper (R-Ky.), who introduced (with Sen. Thomas Dodd (DConn.)) a public accommodations bill based solely on the Fourteenth Amendment:
MR. KENNEDY. . . . The Constitutional authority of Congress to enact this
law is derived from the commerce clause and the 14th amendment, but our
primary reliance is on the commerce clause.
The list of public accommodations covered . . . demonstrates that each
has a direct and intimate relation to the movement of persons and goods
across State lines, and in the words of the late Justice [Robert] Jackson:
["]If it is interstate commerce that feels the pinch, it does not matter how
local the operation which applies the squeeze.["] (United States v. Women's
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I believe in this bill, because I believe in the dignity of man,
not because it impedes our commerce . . . . I like to feel that
what we are talking about is . . . an issue that involves the

morality of this great country of ours. And that morality, it
seems to me, comes under the 14th amendment, where we
speak about immunities and where we speak about equal
170
protection of the law.

Sportswear Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460, 464 (1949) ....
In addition to the commerce clause, we rely on Congress' power under
the 14th amendment, to prohibit the denial of equal protection of the laws
to any person. . . . We recognize that in 1883 the Supreme Court held in
the Civil Rights Cases [that] Congress did not have power under the 14th
amendment to prohibit discrimination in privately owned places of public
accommodation ....
But in 80 years, much of the force of that decision has disappeared. State
regulation of private business has increased. State relationships with business
have become more varied and complex, and views of what action may be
attributed to the State have changed ...
However, the 1883 decision has not been overruled and remains the law
of the land. It is for this reason that we rely primarily on the commerce
clause. . . . [W]e feel it is absolutely clear that Congress has the power to
end discrimination in places of public accommodation under the provisions
of the commerce clause.
SENATOR COOPER ....
I do not suppose that anyone would seriously
contend that the administration is proposing legislation, or the Congress is
considering legislation, because it has been suddenly determined, after all
these years, that segregation is a burden on interstate commerce. We are
considering legislation because we believe.., that all citizens have an equal
right to have access to goods, services, and facilities which are held out to
be available for public use and patronage.
If there is a right to the equal use of accommodations held out to the
public, it is a right of citizenship and a constitutional right under the 14th
amendment. It has nothing to do with whether a business is in interstate
commerce or whether discrimination against individuals places a burden on
commerce. It does not depend upon the commerce clause and cannot be
limited by that clause, in my opinion, as the administration bill would do....
[Tihe interstate commerce approach would grant only partial relief; it
would declare legislatively that the equal right of all citizens to use public
accommodations is only applicable to businesses affecting interstate commerce, and would thus admit discrimination in other businesses. ...
So, for these reasons, I hold that [S. 1591] is superior to the administration
bill. It would cover all businesses which are licensed by the State . . . and
which are held out for public use....
If we are going to deal with this question of the use of public accommodations, I think it imperative that Congress should enact legislation which
would meet it fully and squarely as a right under the 14th amendment, and
not indirectly and partially as the administration's approach would do.
Rights under the Constitution apply to all citizens, and the integrity and
dignity of the individual should not be placed on lesser grounds such as the
commerce clause.
Id- at 23, 190-93.
170. Id. at 252 (statement of Sen. John 0. Pastore (D-R.I.)).

573
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Some in Congress thus had a moral desire to challenge the
Court to redefine the Fourteenth Amendment and to give Congress the power to control the actions of individual business
owners as well as state governments.171 The Senate committee
chose to follow what appeared to be the constitutionally safer
course and relied instead solely on the Commerce Clause. In
doing so, the committee noted the language of Justice Stone in
United States v. Darby:172 "The motive and purpose of a regulation
of interstate commerce are matters for the legislative judgment
upon the exercise of which the Constitution places no restriction
and over which the courts are given no control."'73 The committee
cited a number of cases in which Congress had successfully
discouraged "evil, dangerous or unwise practices" through application of the Commerce Clause. 7 4 Many of them, perhaps not
surprisingly, were the same cases Congress relied on in passing
the ill-fated first Child Labor Act in 1916.175 The House committee

reached similar conclusions with regard to the proper form of
the bill.1 76 On July 2, 1964, President Johnson signed the Civil

Rights Act of 1964 into law.
Almost immediately, however, challenges to the Act's constitutionality began in the courts. Before year's end, two cases had
reached the Supreme Court: Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United
States,177 challenging the provisions with regard to hotels and
motels, and Katzenbach v. McClung,7" challenging the provisions
relating to restaurants and cafeterias. In both cases, the Supreme
Court upheld Congress' action.
Unlike the first failed congressional attempt to reverse the
Court's child labor decision by purporting to have a different
constitutional basis for its new action, in the case of the Civil
Rights Act, Congress successfully evaded the precedent set in
171. See also S. REP. No. 872, supra note 156, at 12, reprintedin 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
2366 ("There is a large body of legal thought that believes the Court would either reverse
the earlier decision if the question were again presented or that changed circumstances
in the intervening 80 years would make it possible for the earlier decision to be
distinguished.").
172. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
173. S. REP. No. 872, supra note 156, at 13, reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2367
(quoting Darby, 312 U.S. at 115).
174. Id. (citing Darby, 312 U.S. 100); Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Md. Ry., 242 U.S.
311 (1917); Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913); Hippoite Egg Co. v. United States,
220 U.S. 45 (1911); Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
175. Compare with the discussion supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
176. See H.R. REP. No. 914, supra note 166.
177. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
178. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
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the Civil Rights Cases decision by basing its 1964 law on the
Commerce Clause rather than the Fourteenth Amendment. The
Court used that fact as its means of distinguishing the 1964 Act
frbm the earlier 1875 Act:
Unlike Title H of the present legislation, the 1875 Act broadly
proscribed discrimination in "inns, public conveyances on land
or water, theaters, and other places of public amusement,"
without limiting the categories of affected businesses to those
impinging upon interstate commerce. In contrast, the applicability of Title H is carefully limited to enterprises having a
direct and substantial relation to the interstate flow
of goods
179
and people, except where state action is involved.

The 1875 Act, the Court implied, might have passed constitutional muster had Congress based it on the commerce power. 180
This claim may be somewhat spurious, however, given the much
more limited reading of the Commerce Clause prior to the 1930's.
A more interesting question, perhaps, is whether the Court
would have found the Act constitutional if, as Senator Pastore
and Senator Cooper advocated, it had been grounded entirely in
the Fourteenth Amendment. Given the societal changes in the
eighty years following the Civil Rights Cases, and particularly
the impact of the civil rights movement of the 1950's and early
1960's, the Warren Court-already known for its liberal social
ideals-might well have overturned the Civil Rights Cases outright if Congress had pressed the issue. 8' If so, as in the child
labor example, Congress would have "succeeded" in reversing
the Court simply because the Court, due to a change in the
philosophy of its members, had itself changed.

179. Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 250-51.
180. Finally, there is language in the Civil Rights Cases which indicates that the
Court did not fully consider whether the 1875 Act could be sustained as an
exercise of the commerce power.... [T]he Court went on specifically to
note that the Act was not "conceived" in terms of the commerce power and
expressly pointed out: ...
"these remarks [as to lack of congressional power] do not apply to those
cases in which Congress is clothed with direct and plenary powers of
legislation over the whole subject . . . as in the regulation of commerce . ..."

Id. at 251 (quoting The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 18 (1883)).
181. The Civil Rights Cases still have not been expressly overruled, although the Court
questioned the decision's continuing vitality in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S.
409, 441 n.78 (1968) (noting that Katzenbach and Heart of Atlanta had rendered the
question of the decision's continuing vitality largely academic).
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Relative to the Court's relationship with Congress, one must
note that the Court showed great deference to the congressional
findings of fact underlying the Act. In Katzenbach, for example,
although the bill contained no congressional findings about the
impact of restaurant discrimination on commerce, the Court relied
on Congress' conclusion that discrimination somehow 182affected
commerce in finding a rational basis for the provisions.
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968
The Initial Decision
Between 1953 and 1969, the Supreme Court, under the leadership of Chief Justice Earl Warren, took a revolutionary approach to criminal liw by greatly expanding the recognized rights
of criminal defendants'8 and restricting the admissibility of im184
properly obtained evidence.

Although innovations such as the Miranda warning are viewed
today as routine by any viewer of television police dramas, many
received the Warren Court's decisions with great skepticism.8 s
Three Supreme Court decisions were subject to particular denigration: 186 Mallory v. United States, 87 which held that in the
federal system, arraignment must be made without unnecessary
delay;'8 Miranda v. Arizona,8 9 which held that an accused must
be advised, prior to interrogation, of his rights to silence and to
the assistance of counsel to protect his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination;'9 and United States v. Wade,'9'

182. Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 299 ("[W]hile no formal findings were made, . . . it is well
that we make mention of the testimony at [the congressional] hearings ... of the burdens
placed on interstate commerce by racial discrimination in restaurants.").
183. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (requiring recitation of certain
rights to a suspect).
184. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (excluding evidence seized in violation
of the Fourth Amendment).
185. See, e.g., 113 CONG. REc. 21,087 (1967) (statement of Rep. F. Edward H6bert (DLa.)) ("It is a wonder . . .that the police can arrest anyone-under the rulings of the
present Supreme Court."); id. at 21,197 (statement of Rep. Watkins M. Abbitt (D-Va.))
("Apparently the majority of the members of the Supreme Court of America are more
interested in protecting the lawless than they are in preserving law and order ...
186. ADAM C. BRECKENRIDGE, CONGRESS AGAINST THE COURT 4-5 (1970).
187. 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
188. Id at 455.
189. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

190. Id- at 467-69.
191. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
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which held that an accused had the right to counsel at police
92
lineups.
The Stealth Response
Congressional skepticism over the Court's decisions turned into
action when Congress began consideration of the bill

93

that would

eventually become the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 1968.194 Although most of the Act dealt with other matters,

Title II of the Act 95 sought directly to overturn those three
Supreme Court decisions. Senator John L. McClellan (D-Ark.),
Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and
Procedures, set the tone for debate on the measure by remarking
that he was "unequivocally convinced . . .that something must

be done to alleviate the baleful effects of the Supreme Court's
196
5-to-4 Miranda decision."'
Senator Sam J. Ervin (D-N.C.), in his opening remarks, more
specifically defined those "baleful effects," stating:
[Tihere is no question that these decisions have resulted in the
freeing of multitudes of criminals of undoubted guilt and have
unduly hampered legitimate law enforcement activities. The

192. Id. at 236-37.
193. S. 917, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), in Controlling Crime Through More Effective
Law Enforcement: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedureof the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 96-101 (1967) [hereinafter Senate
Crime Hearings];H.R. 5037, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), in Anti-Crime Program:Hearings
before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-6
(1967) [hereinafter House Crime Hearings].S.917 and H.R. 5037, as originally proposed,
did not contain language aimed at reversing any Supreme Court decision. Instead, the
original bills contained President Lyndon B. Johnson's proposals to provide planning and
program grants to state and local governments and other organizations for crime control
and to establish a new Office of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice Assistance in
the Justice Department. See also BRECKENREDGE, supra note 186, at 2-3.
The language aimed at reversing the Supreme Court decisions, added to S. 917 in
committee, was taken from Senator John L. McClellan's (D-Ark.) proposed S.674, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), in Senate Crime Hearings, supra, at 74. The version which finally
passed and was signed into law was nominally the House version, H.R. 5037, but the text
of the amended Senate bill had been substituted for the original language of the House
bill. (The House's decision to adopt the Senate version, made on June 5, 1968, may have
been influenced by the assassination of Robert F. Kennedy and resulting anti-crime
sentiment.) The measure, which had earlier passed the Senate by a 72-4 vote, passed in
the House as well by a vote of 369-17. 114 CONG. REC. 14,798, 16,300 (1968).
194. Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (1968) (codified at 18 U.S.C. SS
3501-3502 (1988)).
195. Id. at 210-11.
196. Senate Crime Hearings,supra note 193, at 4.
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situation must be rectified and the duty to do so devolves
rightly upon the Congress. 197
From a constitutional standpoint, Congress' desire to, in effect,
overturn Mallory did not appear to pose a great problem. The
Supreme Court had not decided Mallory on constitutional grounds,
rather its decision relied upon an interpretation of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure. 198 As such, it was within the power
of Congress to correct the Court's interpretation of the Rule, as
it could with any federal statute.'"
Miranda and Wade, however, appeared more difficult for Congress to reverse. In both, the Supreme Court reached its decisions
by interpreting the Constitution rather than a statute-in Miranda the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, 201
and in Wade the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 20 ' As House
Judiciary Committee Chairman Emanuel Celler (D-N.Y.) warned,
legislation appearing to overturn a Court decision but destined
to be itself declared unconstitutional would be "a cruel hoax on
citizens for whom crime and the fear of crime are the facts of
2 2
life. . . . It is built on false premises. Its promises are illusory."
Others in Congress, however, expressed the belief that Congress could attack the Court's constitutional interpretation headon and win: "I refuse to concede . . . that the elected represen-

197. Id.
198. Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 451-53 (1957). The Court addressed application of FED. R. CRM. P. 5(a) which stated:
An officer making an arrest under a warrant issued upon a complaint or
any person making an arrest without a warrant shall take the arrested
person without unnecessary delay before the nearest available commissioner
or before any other nearby officer empowered to commit persons charged
with offenses against the laws of the United States. When a person arrested
without a warrant is brought before a commissioner or other officer, a
complaint shall be filed forthwith.
Id (prior to 1972 amendment).
199. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2112, 2126 (quoting subcommittee testimony of the Honorable Alexander Holtzoff, United
States District Judge for the District of Columbia) ("This doctrine was predicated not on
any constitutional principal, but merely is a procedural matter as a sanction or a means
of enforcing rule 5 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure ....

Since this rule is

not based on any constitutional principle, it can be changed by legislation."); id. (quoting
subcommittee testimony of California Attorney General Thomas C. Lynch) ("Since the
...rule was formulated in the exercise of the Supreme Court's supervisory powers over
lower Federal courts, and has never been considered a constitutional requisite, no
constitutional obstacle is imposed in the way of its legislative repeal.").
200. U.S. CONST. amend. V; see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-79 (1966).
201. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236-37 (1967).
202. 114 CONG. REC. 16,066 (1968).
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tatives of the American people cannot be the winner in a confrontation with the U.S. Supreme Court," declared House Minority
Leader Gerald R. Ford (R-Mich.) 3 "To admit that is to admit
that the American people cannot control the U.S. Supreme
Court."204

In the case of § 3501, °5 directed at Miranda,Congress seemed
to rely primarily on hope that, by building a careful record of
its decision to pass the section, it could persuade the Court to
see the error of its ways. As the Judiciary Committee's report
on the bill noted, the legislative process of hearings and debate
makes it possible for Congress to examine the various facets of
an issue with greater precision than a court limited to the facts
of a particular case.

203. Id. at 16,073.
204. Id.
205. Section 3501 provided, in pertinent part, that:
(a) In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States or by the
District of Columbia, a confession . . .shall be admissible in evidence if it
is voluntarily given. Before such confession is received in evidence, the trial
judge shall, out of the presence of the jury, determine any issue as to
voluntariness. If the trial judge determines that the confession was voluntarily made it shall be admitted in evidence and the trial judge shall permit
the jury to hear relevant evidence on the issue of voluntariness and shall
instruct the jury to give such weight to the confession as the jury feels it
deserves under all the circumstances.
cb)The trial judge in determining the issue of voluntariness shall take
into consideration all the circumstances surrounding the giving of the confession, including (1) the time elapsing between arrest and arraignment of
the defendant making the confession, if it was made after arrest and before
arraignment, (2) whether such defendant knew the nature of the offense with
which he was charged or of which he was suspected at the time of making
the confession, (3) whether or not such defendant was advised or knew that
he was not required to make any statement and that any such statement
could be used against him, (4) whether or not such defendant had been
advised prior to questioning of his right to the assistance of counsel; and (5)
whether or not such defendant was without the assistance of counsel when
questioned and when giving such confession.
The presence or absence of any of the above-mentioned factors to be taken
into consideration by the judge need not be conclusive on the issue of voluntariness of the confession.
18 U.S.C. S 3501(a), (b) (1988) (emphasis added). The italicized language placed the Act in
direct conflict with the Miranda decision, which absolutely required that the accused be
warned of his right to remain silent; of the fact that anything said could be used against
him; of his right to have an attorney present during questioning- and of his right to have
an attorney appointed to represent him if he could not afford one. Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966).
206. See S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 199, at 47, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
2133; see also id. at 46-47, 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2132-33 (quoting subcommittee testimony
of Chief Judge J. Edward Lumbard of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
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Passage of this bill with all of its legislative history-the record
of the subcommittee hearings and all of the underlying social
policies bearing on this issue and taken into account by Congress-will furnish an excellent record that will hopefully
make
207
an impression on some of the Supreme Court Justices.
After all, the Court had recognized its willingness to defer to
such congressional efforts just three years earlier in Katzenbach
28

v. McClung.

The Senate report also noted that the Miranda opinion contained something of an open invitation for Congress or the States
to legislate alternatives to the specific procedural framework the
opinion created 20 9 As Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote for the
majority:
[T~he Constitution does not require any specific code of procedures for protecting the privilege against self-incrimination
Circuit). Judge Lumbard stated:
In my opinion, it is most important that the Congress should take some
action in the important areas I have discussed. The legislative process
permits a wide variety of views to be screened and testimony can be taken
from those who know the facts and those who bear the responsibility for
law enforcement.
The legislative process is far better calculated to set standards and rules
by statute than is the process of announcing principles through court decision
in particular cases where the facts are limited. The legislative process is
better adapted to seeing the situation in all its aspects and establishing a
system and rules which can govern a multitude of different cases.
Judges seldom have before them all those who are the best informed
regarding practical problems and the difficulties in living with any proposed
change in the law. Judges usually are advised only by the parties in the
case; the parties want to win the case and do not always care about general
principles of wider application.
...[I]t is because the Congress and the legislatures of the States have
taken so little action in the field of criminal justice that the courts have
more and more chosen to lay down rules which have the force of law until
changed, and which all too frequently come to us in the form of new
constitutional principles which then can be modified only by constitutional
amendment.
Id.
207. Id.; see also id. (quoting California Att'y Gen. Lynch). Mr. Lynch stated:
The bill under consideration sets out factors bearing on the voluntariness of
confessions. If findings of fact are made by Congress that demonstrate the
relevance and importance of these factors, and their superiority over the
rules laid down in Miranda, it would seem that the Court would have little
choice but to defer to the expert judgment of Congress. Accordingly, I
consider the bill constitutional ....

Id.
208. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
209. S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 199, at 50-51, reprintedin 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2137
(quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467).
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during custodial interrogation. Congress and the States are
free to develop their own safeguards for the privilege, so long
as they are fully as effective as those described. . . in informing accused persons of their right of silence and in affording
a continuous opportunity to exercise it.210

The Court did not intend, however, by that invitation to give
Congress carte blanche to reverse its decision. The Court's language-"so long as they are fully as effective as those
described" 211- seemed to indicate that the procedures it set down
were intended to exemplify the minimum required to protect the
Fifth Amendment rights of the accused.2 12 Anything less would
be unconstitutional.2 13 As the opinion remarked: "[T]he issues
presented [in Miranda]are of constitutional dimensions and must
be determined by the courts. . . Where rights secured by the
Constitution are involved, there can be no rule making or legis214
lation which would abrogate them."
Part of Congress' hopes for the survival of Title H in the face
of Miranda's requirements rested on the fact that Miranda had
been a five-to-four decision. Senator McClellan, author of the
portion of Title II directed at Miranda,expressed optimism that
at least one Justice, faced with a clear statement from Congress,
might change "on the side of law and order instead of continuing

210. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 490; see also id. at 467:
It is impossible for us to foresee the potential alternatives for protecting
the privilege which might be devised by Congress or the States in the
exercise of their creative rule-making capacities. Therefore we cannot say
that the Constitution necessarily requires adherence to any particular solution for the inherent compulsions of the interrogation process as it is
presently conducted. Our decision in no way creates a constitutional straitjacket which will handicap sound efforts at reform, nor is it intended to
have this effect. We encourage Congress and the States to continue their
laudable search for increasingly effective ways of protecting the rights of
the individual while promoting efficient enforcement of our criminal laws.
211. Id. at 490.
212. BRECKENRIDGE, supra note 186, at 59-60.
213. This concern may have moved the Senate Judiciary Committee, with an eye
toward making a favorable record for later review by the Court, to remark in its report
on the measure:
The committee is of the view that the legislation proposed in . . .title H
would be an effective way of protecting the rights of the individual and
would promote efficient enforcement of our criminal laws. . . .[A] civilized
society could not be more fair to persons accused of crime, as the constitutional rights of defendants in criminal cases would be fully protected and
respected by the safeguards in this proposed legislation.
S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 199, at 51, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2137.
214. Miranda,384 U.S. at 490-91.
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to insist on a position that obviously does work to the advantage
215

of criminals."
McClellan did not, however, wish to pursue the one option by
which Congress could be certain to make an impression on the
Court: a constitutional amendment.216 His primary concerns were
the difficulty of achieving the ratification of an amendment and
the delay involved in the ratification process; the evils of the
Court's decisions, he argued,
should be dealt with immediately,
21 7
and therefore, by a statute.
The arguments for passage of S 3502,218 which targeted Wade,

were less carefully crafted than those for 5 3501, despite the fact

215. BRECKENRIDGE, supra note 186, at 59 (quoting Senate Crime Hearings,supra note
193, at 180). McClellan, hoping that a change in the makeup of the Court might gain him
that one vote, said: "The Supreme Court changes. You cannot depend on it being stable.
I hope we get men on the Court in time who will decide that this Court was wrong. I
hope it will become a reality and not only a probability." Id. at 66. His hope may not
have been a vain one-by 1969, two members of the Miranda majority, Chief Justice
Warren and Justice Fortas, had left the court, and Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Blackmun replaced them. One Miranda dissenter, Justice Clark, also left the Court, only
to be replaced by Justice Thurgood Marshall, who proved to be a staunch advocate of
the rights of the accused.
216. The version of Title II approved by the Senate committee did, however, contain
an alternate means of attacking Miranda. Section 3502 of the committee bill (in the
committee bill, the Wade provisions were §3503) attempted to withdraw federal court
jurisdiction to review decisions of state courts regarding the admission of voluntarily
made admissions or confessions. S. 917, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. S 3502 (1968) (Senate Judiciary
Committee version), in S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 199, at 10. This proposal was
apparently based on Congress' constitutional powers to control the organization of inferior
federal courts and to regulate the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. U.S.
CONST. art. I, §§ 1, 2, cl. 2. Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr. (D-N.C.), who originally proposed
the measure, argued that it would place responsibility for such decisions where they
belonged, with state trial courts and courts of appeals, rather than with a federal review
court far removed from the first hand knowledge of the trial judge and jury. BRECKENRIDGE, supra note,186, at 59.
Senator Wayne Morse (D-Or., a Title II opponent, said of this proposal:
[W]e find in the bill . . . sections that withdraw jurisdiction over several
issues from the federal courts. . . . I find these the most repugnant sections
of the whole bill.. . . [It] smacks of a court packing scheme: When you do
not like the decision, change the judges. Or when you do not like the decision,
withdraw the jurisdiction.
114 CONG. REC. 11,595-96 (1968); see also id. at 12,293 (statement of Sen. Hiram L. Fong
(D-Haw.)) ("[T]he exceptions and regulations clause does not give the Congress the power
to abolish Supreme Court review in every case involving a particular subject... . To
interpret that clause otherwise would give the Congress the power to destroy the essential
function of the Supreme Court in our Federal system."). The provision was eliminated
by the full Senate in a 52-32 vote. Id. at 14,777.
217. BRECKENRIDGE, supra note 186, at 58.
218. The proposal, denominated as S 3503 in the Senate committee version of the bill,
read as follows:
The testimony of a witness that he saw the accused commit or participate
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that Wade lacked Miranda's express invitation from the Court
for Congress to experiment. Presumably, Congress intended the
arguments made in favor of the Miranda section to apply to
3502 as well.
Discussion of the section and the Wade decision it attacked,
both in committee and in Congress, was limited. The Senate
committee report noted only, without specific evidence, that the
decision "struck a harmful blow" to efforts to control crime, and
that the decision had nothing in the Constitution to justify it.219
Although Congress may have believed that, in Title II, it had
fashioned a constitutional means of reversing the Supreme Court's
decisions in Miranda and Wade, history has not yet proven
Congress correct. After twenty-two years, neither section has
faced a challenge before the Supreme Court.22 The reason for
this silence is that Congress' actions, once taken, were not implemented by those responsible for putting them into effect.
In a memorandum issued on June 11, 1969, the Nixon Justice
Department instructed all United States Attorneys to, in effect,
ignore Title II in most cases:
Aside from any constitutional issues .

.

. it is impossible to

predict how much weight a particular court will give to the
absence of one of the factors mentioned [in Title HI. For this
reason, the only safe course for federal investigative agents,
and for such United States Attorneys as may have occasion to
talk with defendants, is to continue their present practice of
giving the full Miranda warnings.'

in the commission of the crime for which the accused is being tried shall be
admissible into evidence in a criminal prosecution in any trial court ordained
and established under article III of the Constitution of the United States;
and neither the Supreme Court nor any inferior appellate court . . . shall
have jurisdiction to review, reverse, vacate, modify, or disturb in any way
a ruling of such a trial court . . . admitting in evidence .
mony ....

..

[such] testi-

S. 917, supra note 216, at S 3503 (Senate Judiciary Committee version), in S. REP. No.
1097, supra note 199, at 10. This language conflicted with the holding in Wade that in
some cases the testimony of an eyewitness who had previously identified the accused in
a lineup when accused's counsel was not present might not be admissible. Following the
defeat in the full Senate of the original S 3502, see discussion supra note 216, this
provision became new S 3502. The full Senate later eliminated the language restricting
federal appellate jurisdiction by a 50-31 vote. The resulting Act, therefore, applied only
to federal and not to state criminal prosecutions. See 18 U.S.C. S 3502 (1988).
219. S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 199, at 53, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2139.
220. See infra notes 225-26.
221. Memorandum No. 584, Supp. No. 3 from the Dep't of Justice to U.S. Attorneys
(June 11, 1969), reprinted in 115 CONG. REc. 23,236 (1969).
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This instruction to federal prosecutors was, in retrospect, somewhat surprising given then-candidate Richard M. Nixon's strong
endorsement of the Title II proposal in a position paper released
during the 1968 presidential campaign.2 Viewed cynically, Nixon's campaign statement may have been intended primarily to
draw a distinction between himself and the Democrats on the
"law and order" issue,m rather than as an endorsement of the
constitutionality of the proposed legislation. Once in office, the
Nixon administration may have belatedly realized that Title II,
although clear in its symbolic intent, was vague in its applica224
tion.
In any case, although Congress may have sent a signal to the
Court of its disapproval of Miranda,the practical effect of § 3501
remains negligible. Later administrations have not strayed from
Nixon's lead in following Miranda rather than § 3501, and, as a
result, the section has never faced a constitutional challenge
before the Supreme Court.m

222. Richard M. Nixon, Toward Freedom from Fear (May 8, 1968) (position paper on
crime), reprintedin 114 CONG. REC. 12,936-38 (1968).
The . . . decisions of the high court have had the effect of seriously hamstringing the peace forces in our society and strengthening the criminal
forces. The balance must be shifted back toward the peace forces in our
society and a requisite step is to redress the imbalance created by these
specific court decisions. I would thus urge Congress to enact proposed
legislation that-dealing with. . . Miranda. . .- would leave it to the judge
and the jury to determine both the voluntariness and the validity of any
confession. And I think they point up a genuine need-a need for future
presidents to include in their appointments to the United States Supreme
Court men who are thoroughly experienced and versed in the criminal laws
of the land.
Id. at 12,937-38. See generally FRED P. GRAHAM, THE SELF-INFLICTED WOUND 305-32 (1970)
(discussing the history of Title Irs passage).
223. The day before the Nixon statement was released, President Lyndon B. Johnson
sent a letter to Senator Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.), the majority floor leader, urging
passage of the proposals in Title I of the Omnibus bill. The letter made clear Johnson's
opposition to Title II, stating: "We can best do this by: . . . [n]ot encumbering the
legislation with provisions raising grave constitutional questions ....
" President's Letter to the Majority Leader of the Senate regarding the Crime Control and Safe Streets
bill, 4 PuB. PAPERS 772, 773 (May 9, 1968), reprintedin 114 CONG. REC. 12,450 (1968).
224. Former President Johnson expressed similar reservations regarding the efficacy
of the Act. Statement by the President upon Signing the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968, 4 PUB. PAPERS 981, 983 (June 19, 1968) (referring to "the
provisions of Title H, vague and ambiguous as they are").
225. The constitutionality of S 3501 has, however, received some support in the United
States Courts of Appeals. See, e.g., United States v. DiGiacomo, 579 F.2d 1211, 1219 (10th
Cir. 1978) (Barrett, C.J., dissenting):
The Supreme Court has not been called upon to rule on the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. S 3501(b). To be sure, the Supreme Court is the final and
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Section 3502, designed to "repeal" Wade, has proven similarly
ineffective.

26

As one commentator wrote:

As a practical matter, the Congressional [response to Wade]
has proved to be meaningless. The inferior federal courts have
considered themselves bound by the Supreme Court's reading
of the Constitution rather than that of the Congress and have
appeared to ignore the new statute. It exists on the books
more as the expression of a legislative hope than as a binding
rule of decision, and it will presumably continue in this posture
until the Supreme Court, if it ever does, overrules or modifies
its identification decisions.
. . .[Congress] appeared to overlook completely the threat
to the conviction rate inherent in the impatience of juries with
prosecution cases limited to incourt identification. It showed
no awareness of the values that may reside, for the prosecution
as well as for the defense, in tightening up pretrial identifi-

ultimate arbiter of any constitutional issue raised involving its applicability.
That, however, is no reason for this court to "bury its head in the sand" in
avoidance of the provisions of S 3501, supra.
The Congress, in obvious recognition of society's needs in the area of
effective administration of the criminal justice system, enacted S 3501, .
in order to vitalize the "totality of the circumstances" rule which, in my
judgment, is both common sensed and fair. It does not abolish the Miranda
guidelines, but instead it places them in proper focus based upon the totality
of all of the facts and circumstances surrounding the confession or admission
against one's Fifth Amendment interest. It avoids a mechanical, unrealistic
application of Miranda.
[Ii cases where incriminating disclosures are voluntarily made without
coercion, and hence not violative of the Fifth Amendment, but are obtained
in violation of one of the Miranda prophylaxes, suppression is no longer
automatic. Rather, we weigh the deterrent effect on unlawful police conduct,
together with the normative Fifth Amendment justifications for suppression,
against "the strong interest under any system of justice of making available
to the trier of fact all concededly relevant and trustworthy evidence which
either party seeks to adduce ... ."
Id. (quoting Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 424 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) and
Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 450 (1974)).
226. Federal appellate courts faced with questions implicating S 3502 have either
declined to address its constitutionality or have interpreted the statute contrary to the
obvioui intent of Congress, so that it did not conflict with Wade. See, e.g., United States
v. Johnson, 461 F.2d 1165 (5th Cir. 1972); United States ex rel. Reed v. Anderson, 461
F.2d 739 (3d Cir. 1972); United States v. Serio, 440 F.2d 827 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 838 (1971); United States v. Valez, 431 F.2d 622 (8th Cir. 1970); United States v.
Butler, 426 F.2d 1275 (1st Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 978 (1971); United States v.
Bennett, 409 F.2d 888 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 852 (1969); United States v. Levi,
405 F.2d 380 (4th Cir. 1968).

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:543

cation procedures so that impressively credible identification
evidence can be adduced.
The entire episode surrounding the passage and effects of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, thus, shows
in two ways the inherent weakness of Congress or, indeed, of
any single branch acting alone as an interpreter of the Constitution. In nearly all cases, one branch's interpretation must have
the support, or at least the acquiescence, of another branch in
order to be effective. Here, Congress' attempt to vary from the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fifth Amendment failed
to win the acceptance of the executive branch, while the judicial
branch has ignored its Sixth Amendment interpretation. As a
result, Title II, although never struck down, has proven to be of
no practical avail.
This result appears at first glance to present an insoluble
dilemma for Congress: its past attempts to reverse the effects
of Court decisions failed because they were too specific, yet the
Miranda portion of the Omnibus Crime Control Act was ineffective because it was too vague. A closer analysis, however, reveals
that such is not the case. From a constitutional standpoint, the
Crime Control Act is anything but vague-it is a direct challenge
to the Court's decisions. Its vagueness lies only in its practical
application. By giving judges a group of factors to weigh as each
individual judge saw fit, it prescribed a solution that would lead
to vastly divergent results in similar cases. Preferring a certain
standard for ease of application in individual cases, the executive
branch decided that Miranda, as problematic as it might have
been, at least had the virtue of certainty.
The Flag Protection Act of 1989
The Initial Decision
In Congress' most recent attempt to reverse a constitutionally
based decision of the Supreme Court, many of the same issues
arose again. The episode began in May of 1989 with the Supreme
Court's decision in Texas v. Johnson,m which struck down a Texas
flag desecration lawm and, in so doing, also effectively invalidated

227. Carl McGowan, ConstitutionalInterpretation and CriminalIdentification, 12 WM.
& MARY L. REv. 235, 249-50 (1970).
228. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
229. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. S 42.09(a)(3) (West 1989).
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a federal flag desecration statute and similar statutes in fortyseven other states.23
Gregory Lee Johnson, who burned an American flag as a part
of a political demonstration during the 1984 Republican National
Convention in Dallas, had been convicted of violating a Texas
statute outlawing the desecration of state and national flags.p,
When the case reached the Supreme Court, a five-to-four majority
held that punishing Johnson for conduct that constituted an act
of symbolic speech would not be consistent with the First Amendment.2
In considering the case, the Supreme Court looked at three
primary questions: whether Johnson's acts constituted expressive
230. See Flag Protection Act of 1989, 18 U.S.C. 5 700(a) (1988), amended by 18 U.S.C. S
700(a) (Supp. I 1989); ALA. CODE S 13A-11-12 (1982); ARz. REV. STAT. ANN. S 13-3703 (1989);
ARK. CODE ANN. S 5-51-207 (Michie 1987 & Supp. 1991); CAL. MIL. & VET. CODE S 614
(West 1988); CoLO. REV. STAT. § 18-11-204 (1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. 5 53-258a (1990); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 11, S 1331 (1987); FLA. STAT. ch. 876.52 (1976); GA. CODE ANN. S 50-3-9
(Michie 1990); HAW. REV. STAT. S 7111107 (1985); IDAHO CODE S 18-3401 (1987); ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 1, para. 3351 (1989); IND. CODE S 35-45-1-4 (1986); IOWA CODE S 32.1 (1989); KAN.
STAT. ANN. 5 21-4114 (1988); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 525-110 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. S 14:116 (West 1986); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, S 254 (West 1964);
MD. ANN. CODE of 1957 art. 27 S 83 (1988 & Supp. 1990); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 264,
S 5 (West 1990); MICH. ComP. LAWS ANN. S 750.246 (West 1991); MINN. STAT. S 609.40
(1990h. MISS. CODE ANN. 5 97-7-39 (1972); MO. REV. STAT. S 578.095 (1990); MONT. CODE
ANN. S 45-8-215 (1989); NEB. REV. STAT. S 28-928 (1989); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. S 201.290
(Michie 1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. S 646-A (Supp. 1990); N.J. STAT. ANN. S 2C:33-9 (West
1982); N.M. STAT. ANN. S 30-21-4 (Michie 1984); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW S 136 (Consol. 1980);
N.C. GEN. STAT. S 14-381 (1986); N.D. CENT. CODE S 12.1-07-02 (1985); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
S 2927.11 (Baldwin 1990); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, S 372 (1990); OR. REV. STAT. S 166.075 (1990);
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. S 2102 (1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS S 11-15-2 (1988); S.C. CODE ANN.
S 16-17-220 (Law. Co-op. 1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. S 22-9-1 (1988 & Supp. 1991);
TENN. CODE ANN. SS 39-5-843, -847 (1982); UTAH CODE ANN. S 76-9-601 (1990); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 13, S 1903 (1974); VA. CODE ANN. S 18.2-488 (Michie 1988); WASH. REV. CODE S
9.86.030 (1990); W. VA. CODE S 61-1-8 (1989); Wis. STAT. S 946.05 (1989). Most of these
state statutes were patterned after the Uniform Flag Act of 1917 which provides, in S 3,
that "[n]o person shall publicly mutilate, deface, defile, defy, trample upon, or by word
or act cast contempt upon any such flag, standard, color, ensign or shield." UNIF. FLAG
ACT 5 3, 9B U.L.A. 52 (1917). The only two states without such statutes are Alaska and
Wyoming.
231. Section 42.09 provided in full:
§ 42.09. Desecration of Venerated Object
(a) A person commits an offense if he intentionally or knowingly desecrates:
(1) a public monument;
(2) a place of worship or burial; or
(3) a state or national flag.
(b) For purposes of this section, "desecrate" means deface, damage, or
otherwise physically mistreat in a way that the actor knows will seriously
offend one or more persons likely to observe or discover his action.
(c) An offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor.
Following Johnson, the Acts of 1989, 71st leg., 1st c.s. Ch. 27, S 2, in TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. S 42.09 (West Supp. 1991), deleted S 42.09(a)(3).
232. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 397.
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conduct, thus permitting him to invoke the First Amendment in
challenging his conviction; whether the State's regulation was
related to the suppression of free speech; and, whether the State's
interest in regulating such conduct was sufficient to justify Johnson's conviction under the mid-tier standard of review established
in Spence v. Washington.m
The Court noted that, given the circumstances surrounding
Johnson's act, "the expressive, overtly political nature of this
conduct was both intentional and overwhelmingly apparent."
Johnson's First Amendment rights were therefore implicated. As
to whether the Texas statute involved suppression of free expression, the Court noted that the only state interest affected
by Johnson's action was its interest in preserving the flag as a
symbol of national unity. 235 Because a threat to the flag's symbolic
value arises only when a person's treatment of the flag communicates some contrary message, the Court found that the State's
interest in protecting the flag was related to "the suppression of
free expression," and therefore implicated the more demanding
standard of Spence rather than the test used in United States v.

O'Brien.36

Applying the Spence test in a fairly strict form of mid-tier
scrutiny, the Court looked closely at the ends pursued by the
statute and the means employed in pursuit of those ends.27 "It

233. 418 U.S. 405, 414 n.8 (1974) (discussed infra note 237). Otherwise, the less demanding test of United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), would have been applied.
See infra note 236.
234. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 406.
235. In its arguments, the State also asserted an interest in preventing breaches of
the peace. The Court decided, however, that that particular interest was not applicable
to the Johnson case because nothing in the record indicated that Johnson's act might
even possibly have led to a breach of the peace. Id. at 408.
236. 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). The O'Brien test for regulations of conduct containing
both "speech" and "non-speech" elements stated that a regulation was acceptable
if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an
important or substantial governmental interest; if the government interest
is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest.
Id. That test was recently employed by the Supreme Court in upholding an Indiana law
banning nude dancing in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456, 2461-63 (1991).
237. Judging by the Court's language, it was not employing true "strict" review. For
example, the Court accepted the State's ends by saying that the government has a
"legitimate interest" in making efforts to preserve the symbolic role of the flag. Johnson,
491 U.S. at 418. The "compelling interest" language associated with true strict review
was absent. This application of mid-tier review rather than strict scrutiny comports with
the Court's statement elsewhere in its opinion that the "government generally has a
freer hand in restricting expressive conduct than it has in restricting the written or
spoken word." Id. at 406.
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is not the State's ends, but its means, to which we object, .. .
to say that the government has an interest in encouraging proper
treatment of the flag . . . is not to say that it may criminally
punish a person for burning a flag as a means of political protest."ms Following that reasoning, the Court affirmed the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals' reversal of Johnson's conviction.2 9
Congress Responds
Although Johnson and his attorneys were pleased with the
Court's decision, they were definitely in the minority. Polls taken
soon after the decision showed that sixty-five percent of Americans disagreed with the outcome, and that over two-thirds of
Americans supported a constitutional amendment to permit laws
forbidding flag burning.20 Some in Congress, however, argued
that polls alone should not be enough to motivate a constitutional
change. "Do we vote for constitutional amendments whenever
the latest public opinion polls indicate public dissatisfaction with
a decision of the Supreme Court?" asked Senator Patrick J.
Leahy (D-Vt.). "If public opinion surveys become the standard,
by the end of the century we are going to need computer
programs to decipher our Constitution."' 1
Political pressures aside, however, many in Congress appeared
to respond on a deeply emotional level to the Court's decision:
In the House of Representatives, Democrats and Republicans
took turns at the microphone assailing the Court in ever more

238. Id. at 418.
239. Id. at 420.
240. See, e.g., Americans Disagree With Supreme Court on Flag Burning Pol, REUTERS,
Jufie 24, 1989, AM cycle (citing a Newsweek poll of 500 adults, with a margin of error of
plus or minus five percentage points. Only 28% agreed with the Court's decision. Also,
71% of those polled favored a constitutional amendment to protect the flag.); Michelle
Battle, Poll: 69% Want Flag Protected, USA TODAY, June 23, 1989, at 1A (polling 453
Americans, with five percentage point margin of error, 69% supported an amendment
and 20% did not); Chris Black, Bush Backed on Flag-Burning,BOST. GLOBE, June 29, 1989,
at 12 (polling 1,003 registered voters with three percentage point margin of error, 72%
supported an amendment and 24% opposed it); Michael D'Antonio & Richard Firstman,
Rallying 'Round the Flag; Across LI and Nation, They're Telling the Court: 0, Say Does
That Star-SpangledBanner Yet Wave, NEWSDAY, July 2, 1989, at 4 (Nassau & Suffolk ed.)
(polling 410 Long Island, N.Y., adults with five percentage point margin of error, 80%
favored amendment and 16% opposed it. The NEWSDAY poll also showed that 68%/ of
those interviewed favored outlawing the desecration of a Bible or Torah, 64% favored
outlawing the flying of the American flag upside down, and 58% favored outlawing the
burning of a copy of the Constitution or the Declaration of Independence.).
241. 135 CONG. REC. S8095 (daily ed. July 18, 1989) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
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passionate terms. Representative Ron Marlenee, Republican of
Montana, evoked the men portrayed in the Marine Corps War
Memorial raising the flag over Iwo Jima and declared, "Yesterday [June 21, 1989, the date the Court's opinion was an-

nounced] those six brave soldiers were symbolically shot in the
back."
Representative Doug Applegate, Democrat of Ohio, said the
Court had "humiliated" the flag and demanded, "Are they
going to allow fornication in Times Square at high noon?"

At his regular news conference this morning [June 22, 1989],
House Speaker Thomas S. Foley said, "Americans look on the

burning of the American flag with abhorrence, and it is deeply
offensive to virtually all Americans, and it will be a difficult

matter for them to understand how it can be justified under
any circumstances."
Similar sentiments came from the Senate, where a resolution
expressing "profound disappointment" in the Court ruling was

passed 97 to 3.
The resolution calls for an immediate study of the impact of
the Court ruling "and to seek ways to restore sanctions against

such reprehensible conduct." It also declares that "Congress
has believed that the act of desecrating the flag is clearly not
speech as protected by the First Amendment." 2
The study called for in the resolution was hardly necessaryCongress faced no shortage of ideas for restoring sanctions against
flag burning. By the time the House Subcommittee on Civil and
Constitutional Rights convened to hold hearings on the issue on
July 13, 1989, the House had referred no fewer than thirty-eight

constitutional amendments and three statutory proposals.2

The

242. Robin Toner, Bush and Many in Congress Denounwe FlagRuling, N.Y. TIMES, June
23, 1989, at A8. The three senators voting against the resolution were Senator Edward
M. Kennedy (D-Mass.), who said it was inappropriate for the Senate to "go on record
criticizing the Supreme Court for discharging its solemn duty," Senator Gordon J.
Humphrey (R-N.H.), who described the resolution as "an exercise in silliness," and Senator
Howard M. Metzenbaum (D-Ohio). Id. The resolution referred to in the article was S.
Res. 151, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC. S7189 (daily ed. June 22, 1989).
243. Statutor and ConstitutionalResponses to the Supreme Court Decision in Texas v.
Johnson: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Civil and ConstitutionalRights of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary,101st Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1989) [hereinafter House Flag Hearings]
(opening statement of Chairman Don Edwards). This number later swelled to 42 constitutional amendment proposals, 5 proposals for statutory provisions, and 4 resolutions
concerning the Texas v. Johnson decision. H.R. REP. No. 231, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 2
(1989); see H.R.J. Res. 302-10, 314-15, 317-19, 321-26, 328-37, 339-40, 342-43, 348-51, 359-60,
365, 377, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); H.R. 2744, 2778, 2855, 2978, 2982, 101st Cong., 1st
Sess. (1989); H.R. Con. Res. 159, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); H.R. Res. 184, 185, 186,
188, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); see also H.. Res. 189, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989)
(declaring July 4, 1989 as "Take Pride in the Flag Day").
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three
Senate Judiciary Committee, meanwhile, was considering
2 4
constitutional amendments and one statutory proposal.
The reasons behind Congress' desire for action to reverse the
Court's decision were twofold. The first, artfully articulated by
Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr. (D-Del.) and others, invoked the
need to preserve the flag as a symbol of national unity.Ps The
second, seldom stated directly, but always present at the margins
of debate, was pure politics.
Arguably, most congressmen were more interested in the political realities of the situation than in the nature of American
unity. Coming as it did close on the heels of a presidential
campaign in which support for the Pledge of Allegiance became
a major issue and in which candidates visited flag factories for
star-spangled photo opportunities,?4 the Supreme Court's decision
seemed to carry ominous political hazards for any congressman
who opposed action to reverse it.247 Indeed, the period between
the November 1988 election and the Court's decision in Johnson
had already seen several flag-related resolutions come before
Congress.m What congressional Democrats wished most of all

244. House Flag Hearings, supra note 243, at 6 (testimony of Sen. Joseph R. Biden,
Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee). This number later grew to include six
proposals for constitutional amendments. See S.J. Res. 165, 167, 169, 171, 179, 180, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); S. 1338, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); see also S. Res. 151,,101st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (expressing disapproval of the Court's opinion).
245. House Flag Hearings,supra note 243, at 9-10 (testimony of Sen. Biden).
246. See, e.g., Ellis Henican, Their PatriotismNever Flags, NEWSDAY, Sept. 20, 1988, at
16.
247. See, e.g., Joseph Mianowany, FlagHearings to Start Next Week, UPI, July 7, 1989,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File (iMlany Democrats, realizing the unpopular
nature of the court decision, fear that if they oppose the president they may be hurt
politically by appearing to not want to defend the flag:'); Joseph Mianowany, Flag
Amendment Puts Dems on Defensive, UPI, June 27, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, UPI File [hereinafter Flag Amendment]:
Hanging over the entire debate for Democrats is the bitter memory of
last year's presidential campaign when Bush, by using subjects such as the
Pledge of Allegiance, raised questions about the patriotism of Democrat
Michael Dukakis.
After the Massachusetts governor failed to adequately respond to Bush's
rhetorical broadsides, many Democrats vowed never to be placed again in
the position of seeming less than patriotic.
248. See, e.g., H.R. Con. Res. 35, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (relating to flag desecration,
introduced on January 27, 1989); H.R. Con. Res. 72, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (criticizing
art schools for encouraging the improper display of the flag, introduced on March 14,
1989); H.R.J. Res. 253, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (proposing a "National Pledge of
Allegiance Day," introduced on May 2, 1989); S. 1177, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989)
(proposing amendments to 36 U.S.C. SS 174-177 (1988) relating to the proper manner of
display of the flag, respect for the flag, and the conduct prescribed for raising, lowering,
and passing of the flag, introduced June 14, 1989).

592

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:543

was to avoid letting the Republicans become the party of the

flag.24

9

As the hearings began, it quickly became apparent that the
multitude of proposals would be lumped into two groups for
consideration: those proposals seeking to amend the United States
Constitution and those seeking a statutory solution.
Most prominent among the constitutional amendment proposals
was the amendment language backed by President George Bush,
which called for a constitutional amendment declaring, "The
Congress and the States shall have power to prohibit the physical
desecration of the flag of the United States." 20 Among the
statutory proposals, the one that initially drew the greatest
amount of interest was Senator Biden's, which sought a change
in the already existing federal flag desecration statute contained
in 5 700 of Title 18 of the United States Code.2 51 Biden's bill 2
called for what appeared to be a small, but significant, alteration.
The old Title 18 language ordering punishment for "[w]hoever
knowingly casts contempt upon any flag of the United States by
publicly mutilating, defacing, defiling, burning or trampling upon
it"

253

would be replaced by language ordering punishment of

"[wihoever knowingly mutilates, defaces, burns, maintains on the
floor or ground, or tramples upon any flag of the United States."' 4

249. Steve Daley, Bush Not Ready to Unwrap Himselffrom Old Glory, CH. Tam., July
9, 1989, at C1. Republicans, meanwhile, appeared anxious to exploit the flag desecration
issue politically. See, e.g., Robin Toner, Political Memo; Flag Fight: From Rhetoric to
Reality, N.Y. Tims, July 24, 1989, at A13 (quoting John Buckley of the National Republican
Congressional Committee: "It's going to be a very long campaign season for those who
get on the wrong side of this. On just these kinds of issues, [the Democrats have] lost
five out of the last six presidential campaigns.").
250. S.J. Res. 180, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); H.R.J. Res. 350, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1989).
251. Flag Protection Act of 1967, 18 U.S.C. § 700 (1988), amended by 18 U.S.C. § 700
(Supp. 1990). But see S. 1177, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989), introduced by Sen. Strom
Thurmond (R-S.C.) on June 14, 1989 (prior to the Johnson decision), which called for
changes in the flag display provisions contained in 36 U.S.C. §§ 174-177 (1988).
252. S. 1338, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
253. 18 U.S.C. § 700(a) (1988), amended by 18 U.S.C. S 700(a) (Supp. 1990) (emphasis
added).
254. House Flag Hearings,supra note 243, at 18 (text of proposed Senate bill, included
as part of prepared statement of Sen. Biden). Representative Thomas E. Petri (R-Wis.)
proposed a similar bill in the House. Petri's bill differed from Biden's only in requiring
that the desecration be performed "publicly" as well as "knowingly." H.R. Res. 2778,
101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). The language of H.R. Res. 2778 was actually identical to
that of an earlier statutory proposal introduced in the Senate by Senator Biden as an
amendment to a child care bill. Biden later withdrew that initial proposal for two reasons.
First, some constitutional experts with whom Biden consulted suggested that the inclusion
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As the House subcommittee and the Senate Judiciary Committee began their hearings, they had four basic options available
to them: a statutory modification of some sort, a constitutional
amendment, both, or neither. The two committee chairmen, at
least, openly preferred a statutory response to Texas v. Johnson2 55
over a constitutional one. Representative Don Edwards (D-Cal.),
chairman of the House subcommittee, made his position clear in
his opening remarks: although the flag was strong enough to
survive this test of fire unscathed, the Constitution might not
be. The American flag is sturdy, he said, "flying proudly through
every fierce battle of every war and through times of social
upheaval." 2 s The Constitution, to the contrary, "is fragile and
can be amended by the votes of legislators caught up in the
emotional whirlwinds of the moment."' ' 7
Edwards was, no doubt, overstating his case a bit by understating the difficulty of adopting a constitutional amendment. As
the flag burning debate revealed, merely achieving a two-thirds
vote of the two houses of Congress, much less the approval of
thirty-eight of the fifty states' legislatures, can be difficult. In
the 200-year history of the United States Constitution, only
twenty-six amendments have been adopted, and only sixteen have
been added since the ratification of the Bill of Rights in 1791.
Even Edwards himself noted that since 1971, when he became
chairman of the subcommittee, "scores-even hundreds" of constitutional amendments have been referred for consideration.2
Of these, only two-the Equal Rights Amendment and voting
representation for Washington, D.C.-received congressional approvals 9 and neither was subsequently ratified by the states.

of the word "publicly" might increase the likelihood that courts would find the statute
unconstitutional, because a requirement of public desecration might suggest that the
statute was attempting to curb the communicative effect of the act rather than the act
itself. Secondly, it appeared that the child care bill might be tied up in Congress for
some time, making a free-standing bill more expeditious. House Flag Hearings,supra note
243, at 19.
255. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
256. House Flag Hearings, supra note 243, at 2 (opening statement of Chairman
Edwards).
257. Id.
258. Id. at 1; see also Richard Wolf, Topic: The Flag Amendment; Don't Let Hysteria
Hurt Flag's Meaning, USA TODAY, July 12, 1989, at 9A (interview with Chairman
Edwards).
259. H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 86 Stat. 1523 (1972) (Equal Rights Amendment);
H.R.J. Res. 554, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 92 Stat. 3795 (1978) (voting representation for
Washington, D.C.).
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Edwards offered a powerful argument that the guarantees of
the First Amendment had never been altered. Quoting constitutional scholar Alan Barth, Edwards reminded the subcommittee:
"It is easier to lose liberty than to win it. The loss comes about,
like so many losses, from forgetfulness, from carelessness."M
President Bush's proposed amendment, he implied, would be such
a careless act, setting a precedent by "amend[ing] and limit[ing]
this free speech provision of the Bill of Rights . . . [which] has
never before been amended."' 1
Although he opposed an amendment, whether Edwards truly
favored a statutory action over no action at all was never clear.
Edwards was one of only sixteen congressmen who voted against
the passage of the original federal flag desecration statute in
1967, and in 1990 his attitude toward the statutory proposals
was tepid at best. He expressed a hope that the issue would
indeed "go away" over time.2 2 Speaking to reporters after the
close of the first day of hearings, he suggested that a statute
might be a tool toward that end. "Hopefully," he remarked, "if
something has to be done, it would be a statute, and hopefully,
2
that will cool the fires." 6e
In the Senate, hearings on the flag desecration issue were held
before Senator Biden's Judiciary Committee. As author of the
only statutory proposal before the committee, Biden plainly preferred that route and, in fact, testified before the House subcommittee in support of his proposal.4
Unlike Edwards, however, Biden was not completely opposed
to the possibility of an amendment. Although he believed that a
statute could be written to meet the constitutional test, he
acknowledged that he had no objection to a constitutional amendment and did not believe that a properly drafted amendment
would necessarily be "amending the Bill of Rights or the first

260. House Flag Hearings,supra note 243, at 2.
261. Id.; see also FlagAmendment, supra note 247:
"This would be the first amendment to the Bill of Rights in 200 years,"
Edwards said. "It could open the door to other amendments. I wonder what
Thomas Jefferson and James Madison would think, that a loony kid in Dallas,
Texas, could do a despicable act and have the Congress jump to amend the
Bill of Rights. I find it appalling."
262. Wolf, supra note 258, at 9A ("It always has happened that way, that these kinds
of emotional issues have a way of clearing up.").
263. Robin Toner, House Subcommittee Takes Up Touchy Issue of ProtectingFlag,N.Y.
TIMES, July 14, 1989, at B6.
264. House Flag Hearings,supra note 243, at 6-20.
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amendment or in any way doing damage to the Bill of Rights. ' 6 5
Biden's argument in favor of a statutory approach relied not
upon the evils of an amendment, as Edwards' had, but rather
upon the relative speed with which a statutory proposal could
be put into effect.
Biden also raised the possibility that both a statute and an
amendment might be passed. The amendment alone, he noted,
would not make burning the flag illegal; it would merely empower
the Congress or the states to pass laws to make such acts illegal.
A revised statute would serve as the enabling legislation needed
267
to give effect to the amendment.
This argument, however, was somewhat disingenuous. A federal flag desecration law already existed. Although Johnson may
have clouded that statute's constitutionality, an amendment would
quickly serve to remove those clouds and restore the existing
statute's vigor. A new statute would give effect to the amendment no better than the old, except possibly during the period
until ratification of the amendment was achieved.
The proamendment faction, conversely, maintained that any
statutory response to Johnson would be inadequate. Any statute
worded broadly enough to survive a constitutional challenge,
amendment supporters contended, would encounter severe problems of both overinclusivity and underinclusivity, because it
would necessarily be unable to distinguish between differing
adverse treatments of a flag. Such a statute would outlaw "good"
flag burnings, such as the Boy Scouts' dignified burning of soiled
or worn flags.2 6 Meanwhile, it would fail to prohibit "bad" acts
not specifically covered in the language of the statute, such as
displaying the flag in an offensive or contemptuous manner
without actually physically damaging it6 9
Proponents of a constitutional amendment also questioned
whether,-absent an amendment, any flag desecration statute, no
matter what words it used, could possibly pass constitutional
muster. Even a facially neutral statute, they argued, would be
struck down if applied to a person who desecrates the flag as an
act of political expression, because Johnson made clear that the
government's interest in preserving the flag as a symbol of

265.
266.
267.
268.
269.

Id
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id-

at
at
at
at
at

6 (testimony of Sen. Biden).
7 (testimony of Sen. Biden).
20 (testimony of Sen. Biden).
142.
143 (testimony of former Assistant Attorney General Charles Cooper).
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national unity is insufficient to overcome an individual's First
Amendment right to free expression.270 Neutral language in a
statute could not mask the fact that Congress' clear purpose in
passing the statute would be to prohibit a particular form of
political expression, rather than to protect the material, thread,
and dye of the flag.271
Although Edwards' remarks hinted that his heart may have
been with the "do nothing" camp, the best spokesman for that
viewpoint was not Edwards, but rather Senator Howard M.
Metzenbaum (D-Ohio). In his minority statement in the Senate
Judiciary Committee's report recommending a statute, Metzenbaum argued that the Court's decision in Johnson did not warrant
any legislative response at all.27, "The Court's decision in Johnson
was a courageous and unpopular one," he wrote, "[it illustrates
the wisdom of allowing the Supreme Court to be the final arbiter
of the Constitution, thereby preventing the sweep of its protec3
tion from varying according to the political passions of the day."2
Attempting to craft a flag desecration statute that could pass
constitutional muster, the Senate Judiciary Committee and the
House Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights summoned the assistance of America's best, or at least best-known,
constitutional thinkers. Both committees heard testimony on the
question from such distinguished witnesses as Harvard Law
School Professor Laurence H. Tribe, former law professor and
judge Robert M. Bork of the American Enterprise Institute, Duke
University Law School Professor Walter E. Dellinger III, Assistant Attorney General William P. Barr of the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel, and former Assistant Attorney
General Charles J. Cooper.2 74 Representatives of veterans' groups
and individual members of the House and Senate also gave
testimony.27r The advice the committee received, however, was
mixed.
-.
Some witnesses, notably Bork and Barr, argued the impossibility of drafting a statute aimed at protecting the flag that

270. Johnson v. Texas, 491 U.S. 397, 411-12 (1989).
271. S. REP. No. 152, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N.
610, 631 (minority views of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch (R-Utah) and Sen. Charles E. Grassley

(R-Iowa)).
272. Id. at 19-20, reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 626-28.
273. Id. at 19, reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 627.
274. House Flag Hearings, supra note 243, at iii.
275. Id.; S. REP. No. 152, supra note 271, at 6, reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 615.
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would survive a constitutional challenge 76 Others, however, such
as Dellinger, Tribe, and Biden, argued that such a statute was
indeed possible. Analyzing Johnson and other Supreme Court
cases, they attempted to determine the reasons underlying the
Court's decision, and by doing so to determine
the statutory
277
elements necessary to satisfy the Constitution.
Tribe first suggested two possible statutes premised on the
idea that the government has an interest in preventing disturbances of the peace. 27s His first proposal was for a general statute,
prohibiting all breaches of the peace, including those incited by
symbolic protests such as flag burning. Johnson, he argued, made
it clear that if a particular act of flag desecration could be shown
to threaten the peace in any way, for example, by provoking a
group of veterans to physically retaliate, then that act of flag
279
desecration could be constitutionally punished by the state.
Tribe's reading of Johnson on this point, however, may be
flawed. Justice Brennan's opinion seems, to the contrary, to
indicate that a state cannot ban the expression of certain ideas
"on the unsupported presumption that their very disagreeableness will provoke violence" by the audience.28° Instead, the Court
276. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 152, supra note 271, at 24, reprintedin 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
631 (minority views of Sens. Hatch and Grassley) (quoting Barr's statement that "it
cannot be seriously maintained that a statute aimed at protecting the flag would be
constitutional"); H.R. REP. No. 231, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1989) (additional views of
Reps. F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. (R-Wis.), Carlos J. Moorhead (R-Cal.), Bill McCollum
(R-Fla.), George W. Gekas (R-Pa.), William E. Dannemeyer (R-Cal.), Howard Coble (R-N.C.),
D. French Slaughter, Jr. (R-Va.), Lamar S. Smith (R-Tex.), Larkin I. Smith (R-Miss.), and
Craig T. James (R-Fla.) [hereinafter Additional Views]) (quoting Bork):
"No statute can be drawn that can cure the problem created by Texas v.
Johnson. Indeed, if that were possible, it seems to me . . . a far more
dangerous course than amending the Constitution because it would mean
that Congress can overturn Supreme Court constitutional decisions by a
straight majority vote and I don't think that is what our system of government imagines and it is certainly not what Marbury v. Madison [5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137 (1803)], decided by Chief Justice John Marshall, meant."
277. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 152, supra,note 271, at 12, reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
621 (quoting Dellinger's statement that "Itihe proposed Federal statute . .. eliminates
the particular constitutional flaw that was the basis for the Court's decision in Texas v.
Johnson"); id. at 13, reprintedin 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 622 (quoting Tribe's statement that
under the Court's current view it appeared that "insofar as someone is prosecuted only
for damaging the physical integrity of the American flag [and not for the message he
communicates], that prosecution is not barred by the first amendment"); Hose Flag
Hearings, supra note 243, at 20 (Sen. Biden stating- "The key . . . is political expression ....
If there is no communicative impact to the law that the law is attempting to
deal with, then in fact there is not political expression.").
278. House FlagHearings, supra note 243, at 99.
279. Id. at 101.
280. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 409 (1989).
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requires careful consideration of the actual circumstances surrounding each such expression. The government entity wishing
to restrict such an expression must ask whether it is "directed
to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to
incite or produce such action."'8 Merely a potential for a breach
of the peace is not sufficient. 2
Tribe's second suggested statute seemed to correct this problem-a statute directed only at those public assaults upon an
American flag that are calculated to cause an immediate and
serious physical disturbance.m Such a narrowly drawn statute
would, indeed, likely be constitutional, but it was not the type
of statute Congress was seeking to enact. After all, under such
a statute, Gregory Johnson's act of flag burning would have been
perfectly legal because no threat of a physical disturbance was
likely. If the goal of Congress was to undo the Johnson decision
and turn back the clock to the day before the Court announced
that decision, such a statute would plainly fall far short of that
goal.
Most members of Congress wanted a way to stop flag burning
in cases in which not even the most remote possibility of breaching the peace existed. Tribe, Biden, and the other statute proponents had a final proposal that they believed could achieve
that goal.
They began with the assumption that the Texas flag desecration statute in Johnson failed not because the government's
interest in protecting the flag is always outweighed by an individual's First Amendment rights, but rather because the specific
wording of the statute made it a crime to treat the flag "in a
way that communicates a message giving offense to others."
Similarly, the then-existing federal flag desecration statute was
probably as unconstitutional because it made it a crime to "cast[ I
contempt" 285 on the flag by one's acts, rather than to commit the
acts themselves. A respectful flag burning would be perfectly
legal under the old statute, but a flag burning with a contemptuous message would not.m
Thus, to survive a constitutional test, a flag desecration statute
would have to depend upon a government interest that is not
281. Id. at 409 (quoting Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969)).
282. Id.
283. House Flag Hearings, supra note 243, at 101-02.
284. Id. at 50 (testimony of Prof. Dellinger).
285. 18 U.S.C. S700(a) (1988).
286. House Flag Hearings, supra note 243, at 50 (testimony of Prof. Dellinger)
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directed at the idea being communicated by the act. 7 It would
have to operate without any regard to whose flag was burned,
where it was burned, how the audience, if any, might react,
or
2
why the individual chose to burn the flag in the first place.
This line of reasoning may be criticized, however, and in fact
was questioned at the House subcommittee hearings by Representative Sensenbrenner. Quoting from Justice Brennan's opinion
in Johnson, Sensenbrenner asked whether such a claim could be
reconciled with the statement that "the State's interest in preserving the flag as a symbol of nationhood and national unity
[does not] justify his criminal conviction for engaging in political
expression."8 9 While the language of Biden's proposed statute
might be "content neutral," its purpose, as Biden himself stated,
was still related to the flag's role as a symbol of national unity.
Perhaps even more damning was another passage in Brennan's
opinion:
The State . .. asserts an interest in preserving the flag as a

symbol of nationhood and national unity. In Spence, we acknowledged that the government's interest in preserving the
flag's special symbolic value "is directly related to expression
in the context of activity" such as affixing a peace symbol to
a flag ....

We are equally persuaded that this interest is

related to expression in the case of Johnson's burning of the
flag. The State, apparently, is concerned that such conduct will
lead people to believe either that the flag does not stand for
nationhood and national unity, but instead reflects other, less
positive concepts, or that the concepts reflected in the flag do
not in fact exist, that is, we do not enjoy unity as a Nation.
These concerns blossom only when a person's treatment of the
flag communicates some message, and thus are related "to the
suppression of free expression"...

Because the motivating governmental interest behind the statutory proposals was, as with the Texas statute, to protect the
flag's symbolic value,m1 and that interest will always relate to

287. Id. at 50-51.

288. Id. at 102 (testimony of Prof. Tribe).
289. Id. at 20 (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner) (quoting Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S.
397, 420 (1989)).
290. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 410 (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 414 n.8
(1974)).
291. Political expediency, although perhaps the prime motivating interest, would be an
untenable argument before the Court.
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the expressiveness of the conduct, the constitutionality of any
statute designed to further such a purpose appears dubious.
Although Congress might try to disguise that purpose in the
language of the statute itself, the legislative history of the statute
would point directly toward that purpose. As Judge Bork remarked in his testimony before the House subcommittee, "[Tihis
conversation itself dooms any possibility of the constitutionality
of such a statute." 2192 Although the government might claim that
the statute's design was to further a different legitimate interest,
any such claim "would plainly be pretext and would be recognized
' '29
as such by any court. 3
Professor Tribe's response to that problem was a pragmatic
one: 294 he counted heads. Tribe noted that one member of the
five-Justice Johnson majority, Justice Harry A. Blackmun, had
previously written a dissent in Smith v. Goguen29 s in which Blackmun indicated a statute protecting the physical integrity of the
flag in all circumstances would be acceptable.2 6 A statute written
in that manner, Tribe said, would therefore win a majority
composed of the four Johnson dissenters (Justices Rehnquist,
White, O'Connor, and Stevens) plus Justice Blackmun. 7
Following, as Professor Tribe did, a pragmatic analysis of the
question, rather than a principled one, a possibility exists that a
statute broadly drawn to outlaw any intentional physical damaging of a flag may, indeed, have won the support of a majority
of the Court. Equally likely, however, is the possibility that
Justice Blackmun's jurisprudence has shifted farther than Professor Tribe believes in the years since the Smith decision in
1974. The answer may never be known, because the statute
Congress finally adopted was clearly different from that envisioned by Tribe, Dellinger, and Biden.

292. Additional Views, supra note 276, at 17 (quoting Judge Bork).
293. Id. at 17-18.
294. Representative Sensenbrenner, in fact, quoted one of Tribe's own writings ("Factually Neutral Abridgements Motivated by Content Censorship") back to Tribe in asking
for his evaluation of the problem. What Tribe had written was, "If the first amendment
requires an extraordinary justification of Government action which aimed at ideas of
information that Government doesn't like, the constitutional guarantee should not be
avoidable by Government action which seeks to attain that unconstitutional objective
under some other guise." House Flag Hearings,supra note 243, at 127.
295. 415 U.S. 566, 590-91 (1974) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
296. Id.; see House Flag Hearings,supra note 243, at 128. In his statement, Professor
Tribe theorized that Justice Brennan had to make specific reference to Blackmun's earlier
Smith opinion in footnote six of the Johnson opinion in order to get Blackmun to join the
Johnson majority. Id. at 102.
297. House FlagHearings, supra note 243, at 128.
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Testimony at both the House and Senate hearings clarified
that for a statute to have any hope of surviving a constitutional
challenge, it would have to be "content neutrar'- banning all flag
burnings, regardless of the message, or lack thereof, intended by
the flag burner or perceived by onlookers. Even then, as several
experts testified, the constitutionality of the statute may remain
questionable.
Proponents of a constitutional amendment identified several
problems with a statute, the greatest of which was overinclusivity. Congress did not want to put itself in the position of making
criminal the actions of veterans' groups and Boy Scouts in, for
example, holding dignified burnings of worn or soiled flags on
Memorial Day.28
Senator Biden attempted to hurdle this problem by taking a
definitional approach, that is, that the flags burned in such
ceremonies were not truly "flags" at all. Flags that were tattered
and worn to the extent that they were no longer fitting emblems
for display were, in fact, "flags that have already been destroyed."'
He also noted that the Johnson decision mentioned
in passing that federal law designates burning as the preferred
method for disposing of a worn or soiled flag, and that if Johnson
had burned the flag for that purpose, he would not have been
convicted under the federal statute. 0 0 Biden may have erred,
however, in interpreting that reference a's an endorsement of an
exception for the burning of worn flags rather than as an additional reason that a statute with such an exception would be
unconstitutional.
The second problem with Biden's proposed statute was a definitional one: what, under the statute, was a flag? In their
testimony before the House subcommittee, Tribe and Cooper
both mentioned the example of a cake served at a party celebrating the reversal of Lyn Nofziger's conviction for illegal
lobbying' 0 1-a cake decorated to look like the American flag. By
cutting up and eating that cake, party-goers might arguably have
faced criminal charges under a statute such as the one pro02
posed.3

298. See, e.g., id. at 21 (questioning of Sen. Biden by Rep. Sensenbrenner).

299. Id300. I& at 21-22.
301. See Martin Tolchin, Nofziger Wins Court Reversal of Conviction, N.Y. TMES, June
28, 1989, at Al.
302. House Flag Hearings,supra note 243, at 102, 143.
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The final problem was that mere passage of a statute would
not be the last word on the subject of flag desecration. Instead,
the first arrest under the statute would merely signal the beginning of extensive litigation concerning the constitutionality of the
statute. District courts applying the Johnson decision would likely
declare the new statute unconstitutional. Unless the Supreme
Court agreed to grant a writ of certiorari to decide the issue,
Congress might find itself, years later, right back where it
303
began.
The shortcomings apparent in the statutory approach created
a difficult dilemma for opponents of a constitutional amendment.
Although a statute appeared to be their only hope of derailing
the amendment proposals, an unacceptable statute clearly would
not succeed in doing so. Fortuitously, however, the individual
most anxious to avoid an amendment was in one of the best
positions to do something about the problem. Representative Don
Edwards was not only chairman of the House subcommittee
considering the problem, but he also had the subcommittee stacked
4
with like-minded congressmen.30
Edwards' solution was to draft a new statutory proposal that
met all of the practical objections facing the Biden proposal.
Working together with House Judiciary Committee Chairman
Jack Brooks (D-Tex.), he introduced H.R. Res. 2978 on July 24,
1989, four days after the subcommittee completed its hearings.
In its original form, the Edwards/Brooks proposal attempted
to deal with each of the problems facing a content-neutral statute.
To reduce the statute's overinclusivity, the proposal included a
specific exception: "This subsection does not prohibit any conduct
consisting of the disposal of a flag when it has become worn or
soiled."305 They addressed the problem of determining the nature
303. Additional Views, supra note 276, at 10-11.
304. See Wolf, supra note 258, at 9A:
USA TODAY: You've been able to stall a lot of high-profile amendmentsschool prayer, balanced budget and others.
EDWARDS: Yes. With the help of a subcommittee that generally a majority
saw eye to eye with me.
USA TODAY: Which was one of your requirements, wasn't it?
EDWARDS: Almost, yeah. But I have had a majority who sees things the
conservative way. This is a conservative view that I have ... that you don't
fool with your liberties lightly.
See also id. (Rep. Edwards concurring in description of the subcommittee as "a mortuary
because many proposed amendments die there"); House Flag Hearings, supra note 243,
at 3 (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner) ("[T]his subcommittee is commonly known as the
graveyard for legislation which the Democrats don't want to get to the House floor.").
305. H.R. Res. 2978, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
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of a flag under the statute through the addition of a new definitional section: "[T]he term 'flag of the United States'

.

. shall

include any flag, standard, colors, or ensign, or any part or parts
of either, made of any substance, of any size evidently purporting
to be either of said flag, standard, colors, or ensign of the United
States of America."' = Finally, the proposal addressed the pros-

pect of protracted litigation by providing for expedited review
of any constitutional challenge by the Supreme Court.
At the time, Edwards defended the new bill as being carefully
drawn and constitutionally sound,30 7 but he also acknowledged
the political realities that prompted the drafting of the bill,
admitting that the statute "gives members cover. They can tell
the American Legion and the Veterans of Foreign Wars, 'Look,
we protected the flag.' "
The purpose of the statute, he said,
was to avoid a constitutional change, which he and other Democrats would "go to the wall" to stop.309
Seeking to halt the amendment push, Brooks and Edwards
moved quickly. They introduced the bill on July 24, and the
Brooks-led House Judiciary Committee the next day scheduled a
vote on the measure for July 26.10 The full House Judiciary
Committee actually met for two days, on July 26 and 27, to
consider the resolution and approved one amendment-a change
in the "flag" definition to read: "any flag of the United States,
or any part thereof, made of any substance, of any size, in a
form that is commonly displayed." 311 The "commonly displayed"
language, the committee believed, would further reduce the possibility of prosecutions for the destruction of flags on cakes,
napkins, magazine covers, and the like.3 12 On July 27, the com-

mittee voted 28-6 to report the amended bill favorably to the
House, four days before the Senate Judiciary Committee even
began its hearings on the Biden statutory proposal. On September
12, the full House passed it by a 308-38 vote, with many proamendment congressmen joining to support the bill after House

306. Id.
307. Quotelies, USA TODAY, Sept. 13, 1989, at 10A; Robert Shepard, House PassesFlag
ProtectionBill, UPI, Sept. 12, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
308. Richard Wolf, Smoking, Flag Fire Up Congress,USA TODAY, Sept. 12, 1989, at 1A.
309. Joseph Mianowany, House Panel Ignores Bush, Passes Flag Bill, UPI, July 27,
1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
310. Joseph Mianowany, House Democrats Move FlagBill, UPI, July 25, 1989, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
311. Additional Views, supra note 276, at 2 (Explanation of Amendment).
312. Id.
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Speaker Tom Foley (D-Wash.) promised to schedule a vote on an
amendment proposal before the end of the year.3 13 On September
13, it went to the Senate.
The Senate made two major changes to the bill. The first
amendment added two additional acts to the list of those prohibited under the proposal: "physically defil[ing]" the flag 14 and

"maintain[ing the flag] on the floor or ground," 315 the latter in
direct response to a controversial art exhibit in Chicago in which
viewers were required to walk across the flag to reach one
portion of the exhibit 18 A second amendment modified the ex3 17
pedited review section.
On October 12, the House agreed to the Senate's amendments,
and on October 28, the bill became law without the President's
signature. In declining to sign the bill, President Bush stated
that
[w]hile I commend the intentions of those who voted for this
bill, I have serious doubts that it can withstand Supreme Court
review. The Supreme Court has held that the Government's
interest in preserving the flag as a symbol can never be
compelling enough to justify prohibiting flag desecration that
is intended to express a message.318

Although even the original content-neutral statute proposed
by Senator Biden was not certain to survive a constitutional
challenge, plainly, the later additions to that bill's basic structure
made the final statute's survival even less likely.
In redefining the list of prohibited acts to include "physically
defil[ing]" the flag, Congress took a step away from language
arguably not directed toward communication of a message"burn" for example -and toward language indicative of a showing
of contempt.3 19 "Defile" is a word carrying with it a great deal
of emotional meaning-arguably even more so than words such
313. Myron S. Waldman, House Passes Flag-BurningBill; Move Aimed at Heading Off
ConstitutionalAmendment, NEWSDAY, Sept. 13, 1989, at 15.
314. 135 CONG. REC. S12,616 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1989) (Amendment 951).
315. Id. at S12,607 (Amendment 950).

316. See, e.g., Laurie Goering, Veterans Offended by Artwork ofFlag;Art Institute School
Shuts Exhibit, Cm. TRIB., Feb. 26, 1989, at C1.
317. 135 CONG. REC. S12,601 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1989) (Amendment 949).

318. Statement on the Flag Protection Act of 1989, 25 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1619
(Oct. 26, 1989).
319. Arguably, however, some of the language already present in the bill (for example
"trample" or "mutilate") was similarly content laden. See 135 CONG. REc. S12,618-19 (daily
ed. Oct. 4, 1989) (statement of Sen. Pete Wilson).
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as "trample" and "mutilate" which were themselves cited by the
Supreme Court in United States v. Eichman.a Eichman, which
eventually struck down the statute, stated, "Each of the specified
terms-with the possible exception of 'burns'- unmistakably connotes disrespectful treatment of the flag and suggests a focus on
3 21
those acts likely to damage the flag's symbolic value."
In adding a specific exception for the destruction of soiled or
worn flags, Congress made even more obvious that its intent
was not to prevent all destructions of flags, but merely those it
found to be objectionable. The Court cited that addition as proof
of Congress' intent to restrict the communicative impact of flag
burnings, rather than simply to protect the fabric of all flags.m
Finally, the expedited review provision, though not mentioned in
Eichman, indicated that Congress itself had great doubts concerning the constitutionality of the law, and wished to find out
quickly whether it would have to go "back to the drawing board"
to fashion an amendment.
The statute may have failed as an attempt to protect the flag;
however, it may be considered a great success by those whose
goal was merely to avoid a constitutional amendment. The heat
of public passion over the flag issue, which appeared as a raging
inferno in the summer of 1989, proved to be little more than a
brief flash of emotion. Although half-hearted attempts to revive
the constitutional amendment followed the Court's Eichman decision,32s most members of Congress have been more than willing
to let the issue "go away," as Representative Edwards had
originally wanted. The second time around, congressmen were
more willing to acknowledge that the issue was principally a
political one.32
What remains, however, is a rather unflattering picture of
Congress' abilities to interpret the Constitution. Given clear

320. 110 S. Ct. 2404, 2409 (1990).
321. Id.; see also id at 2409 n.7 ("For example, 'defile' is defined as 'to make filthy; to
corrupt the purity or perfection of; to rob of chastity; to make ceremonially unclean;
tarnisb; dishonor.' ") (quoting WEsTE'S TanR NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 597 (1976)).
322. Id- at 2409 (The exception "protects certain acts traditionally associated with
patriotic respect for the flag.").
323. On June 21, 1990, an amendment proposal failed to gain the requisite two-thirds
vote in the House. 136 CONG. REC. H4087-88 (daily ed. June 22, 1990) (House voting 254177 on H.J. Res. 350, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990)); see also, Eliot Brenner, Amendment
FailsHouse Test, UPI, June 21, 1990, availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
324. See, e.g., Eliot Brenner, Flag Protection Amendment Begins Journey Through
Congress, UPI, June 13, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File (quoting Rep.
John Conyers (D-Mich.)) (The amendment issue "is about politics, the politics of re-election,
the politics of hypocrisy, of manipulating the system for political advantage.").
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instructions as to what it had to do to make a constitutional flag
desecration statute, Congress instead did something else. Given
an opportunity to show itself as a principled body, Congress
played politics. Rather than taking a courageous stand either
behind or against the Supreme Court's Johnsondecision, Congress
instead engaged in a massive charade by pretending to act while
public passions seemed to demand it, but actually-and to some
extent intentionally-accomplishing nothing. Although this result
was arguably the best one possible for the country, the route
taken to achieve it was unnecessarily circuitous.
The difficulty lies, perhaps, in the very nature of legislative
decisionmaking. A large legislative body will, almost inevitably,
encounter division over practically any issue-much less by an
issue of constitutional magnitude. Forces in a legislature seeking
to push through an emotional measure will almost always face
equal forces seeking to sidetrack the measure. The result, of
course, is compromise.
The Flag Protection Act of 1989, in its final form, is a prime
example of compromise at the expense of constitutionality. Seeking a statute that could command the support of amendment
proponents, Representatives Edwards and Brooks sought to draft
a bill that would be all things to all people: a bill that would, in
25 without making criminal those
fact, overturn Texas v. JohnsonW
flag burnings of which Congress approved. In doing so, however,
they proceeded in a manner that greatly reduced the chances
that their bill would survive.
ANALYSIS OF FACTORS RELATING TO THE COURT'S DEFERENCE TO
CONGRESS

In reviewing these four episodes in which Congress has challenged a Supreme Court interpretation of the Constitution, one
may identify a number of factors that have determined the
success or failure of Congress' efforts. These factors include the
extent to which Congress is able to disguise its motives; the gap
in time, and resulting changes in the character of the Court,
between the Court's action and the congressional response; Congress' ability to respond to concerns expressed in the Court's
decision by basing its response on different constitutional grounds;
the tone of congressional debate; the extent to which Congress

325. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
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has the cooperation of the states and/or the executive branch;
and the nature of the constitutional issue involved.
Clarity of CongressionalMotives
26 reveal that the Court
Cases such as the Child Labor Tax Cas&e
can see through a sham purpose for legislation if the obvious
intent is to circumvent one of the Court's constitutional holdings.
This is particularly true when the intent of Congress is apparent
not only in its debates and the legislative history of an act, but
on the face of the act itself, as in the Child Labor Tax Act of
1918 and the Flag Protection Act of 1989. The modern Court,
however, is willing to look even "behind the scenes" to determine
the true intent behind a piece of legislation. As Judge Bork noted
in the committee hearings on the Flag Desecration Act, the Court
may use the very fact that Congress discussed reversing a Court
decision in committee as a reason to strike down the resulting
Act.

Passage of Time
The eventual success of its child labor efforts reveals that
Congress, if patient, may eventually be able to wait out the
Court. Particularly in situations in which the current president
has views sharply divergent from the Court, Congress can wait
and hope that new appointments to the Court will transform the
Court's ideology, as happened under Roosevelt in the late 1930's
and under Reagan in the 1980's.
A longer gap in time, such as the eighty-five years that passed
between the Civil Rights Cases2 and the passage of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, may result in an even more fundamental
change. Justices of the Supreme Court are to some extent, like
all people, products of their times. If changes in society as a
whole make a particular Court decision seem unwise, or even
repugnant, a more modern Court raised with more progressive
beliefs is likely to share those views, and be more willing to
reverse such a decision. Of course, if Congress can give the Court
a tailor-made means of distinguishing the new case from the old,

326. 259 U.S. 20 (1922).
327. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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as it did with the Civil Rights Act, the current Justices will find
it even easier to accomplish a change in direction not necessarily
supported by precedent.
Change in ConstitutionalApproach
Congress can help the Court evade the effects of troublesome
precedent by giving the Court an alternative means of addressing
a particular social problem. For this approach to work, however,
the Court must want to evade the precedent. Thus, either Congress must wait for a change in the Court's attitudes toward an
issue or seek to convince the Court that its previous decision
was erroneous or harmful by findings of fact concerning the
3 28
results of the Court's decision.
Tone of CongressionalDebate
In situations in which the Congress shows great concern for
acting in a constitutional manner and in finding a sound constitutional basis for its actions, the Court may be more likely to
show deference to a congressional interpretation even if it is
contrary to a prior precedent, as it did in Heart of Atlanta Motel
v. United States.3 29 Developing a solid record showing the need
for a particular action may also persuade the Court.
When Congress appears motivated by short-term political motives, however, and does not appear to give due consideration to
constitutional issues in determining its course of action, the Court
may show less deference, as in the case of the Flag Protection
Act.
Cooperation With Other Branches
Congress is not able to make constitutional law in a vacuum.
After it adopts a particular interpretation of the Constitution, it
must rely on the assistance of the other branches to give that
interpretation effect. Thus, as in the case of the Omnibus Crime
Control Bill, if Congress attempts to act without the support of
either of the two coordinate branches, its interpretation is likely
to end up as a forgotten footnote rather than as an effective
piece of legislation.
328. In particular, the tax power is now virtually foreclosed to the Congress as a
means toward any end other than raising revenue, as a result of the Child Labor Tax
Case and other similar cases. See supra notes 97-107 and accompanying text.
329. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
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Nature of the ConstitutionalIssue Involved
The Court may show greater deference to a congressional
action rooted in a constitutional area in which the language of
the Constitution itself is vague and the case law is either unclear
or permissive. Thus, actions based on the Commerce Clause or
the war power, in which Congress has been given nearly carte
blanche to act as it sees fit, are more likely to meet with Court
approval than actions based on strictly limited congressional
powers, such as taxation.
The same is true when a separate constitutional issue, such as
speech, is involved. A congressional action viewed as a restriction
of a right specifically enumerated in the Constitution (for example, speech) or in past Court holdings (for example, privacy) will
generally be viewed less favorably by the Court than restrictions
on nonfundamental rights, such as the "right" to employ child
labor.
CONCLUSIONS

Clearly the elected branches may act as interpreters of the
Constitution, even in the face of Supreme Court decisions that
appear to contravene their actions. The manner in which the
elected branches act, however, can be as important as the action
itself in determining whether the Supreme Court will allow their
acts to stand.
To maximize the likelihood that a given action will succeed in
reversing the effects of a prior Supreme Court decision, Congress
first must cautiously draft the language of the act itself. Exceptions added to a measure to address particularized concerns tend
to reveal an act's nature as a "dodge" to avoid a Court ruling,
rather than a principled piece of legislation.1
Evidence of careful consideration by Congress of constitutional
and practical concerns is also helpful in demonstrating to the
Court that it should defer to Congress in a particular case.
Toward this end, the addition of findings of fact to an act, as
well as developing a thorough record in hearings and debate
upon which to base those findings, is particularly important. The

330. Note, for example, the scienter exception in the child labor tax law and the
exception for the destruction of worn flags in the Flag Protection Act the Court seized
upon as clear evidence of Congress' unconstitutional intentions. See supra notes 101, 305
and accompanying text.
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Supreme Court's increasing willingness to look behind the language of the act itself to seek any underlying motives of a
legislative action necessitates such a thorough Congressional
record.
As discussed previously, certain sections of the Constitution,
as currently delineated, give almost limitless power to Congress.
In determining the constitutional basis for a particular action,
Congress should, if possible, employ one of the permissive clauses,
for example, the war power or the commerce power, rather than
clauses that have been read more restrictively, such as the tax
power.
Finally, although it has been reluctant to do so in past, Congress should be willing to consider seriously the possibility of
constitutional amendment-the sole certain way to reverse a
Supreme Court decision. In its considerations, however, Congress
must be mindful of the concerns of the states, because their
cooperation is necessary to the ratification of any amendment.
Mark E. Herrmann

